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Abstract 
This thesis approaches the Norwegian State Education Loan Funds repayment scheme for 
student loans. I light of a more digitized Norway it is reasonable to assess more sophisticated 
approaches to student loan repayment.  
Income-linked loan schemes basically let graduates repay their student loans as fraction of 
their income rather then as function of their principal debt. Meaning you that you repay your 
loan as a percentage of your income, and thus let your payments follow your income growth. 
This has rather attractive feature of giving low-income earners better liquidity in the first 
phase of their career. Hence reducing the risk of large student loans for the borrower and 
reducing the chance of default for the lender.  
The focus of this thesis will be on the repayment scheme. All other aspects of student loans 
will only be presented if appropriate. 
I will begin this thesis with an introduction of income-linked loans as well as a presentation 
of the current history of such repayment schemes in other countries. Thereafter I will 
introduction the current theory and discuss a possible Norwegian application of such a 
scheme. I will further analyze how such a repayment scheme would have turned out if it had 
been employ by the Norwegian State Education Loan Fund in the seventies. Finally I will 
suggest a pragmatic solution to individualizing such fractions of income in a way that 
follows an individual’s income growth. 
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1. An Introduction to Income-Linked Loans 
The idea of income-linked loans for financing human capital originates from Milton 
Friedman in an article dating back to 19451. Friedman explores in Capitalism and Freedom 
the idea of financing education thru equity like instruments. The basic idea sprung from the 
fact that there is a problem when financing education in that the lender has no collateral. In 
the same way as an investor would buy equity to invest in a new venture, he could also 
invest in an equity like instrument to develop human capital.   
Imagine that a student does not have any funds available to finance a college education. He 
is offered two loan options. The first is a mortgage type loan where he upon graduation 
would pay an equal amount, consisting of interest payment and payment on the principal, for 
a given number of years. The second contract is a contract in which he receives funds by 
committing to pay a fraction of his future income for a given period. In essence paying a 
dividend on his earnings to the investor. Which of the two options the student would choose 
depends upon many factors, and the covenants of the contract.  
Norway has since the Norwegian State Education Loan Fund (hereby referred to as NSELF) 
was established in 1946 offered a loan of the first type. Until 1972 the financial aid given by 
NSELF was based on discretion2, but from 1972 and onward financial aid has been available 
to any Norwegian student irrespective of social background. In this thesis I will try to 
explore the second type of contract and its different versions. As such my research question 
for this thesis is: “What if NSELF had instead offered an income-linked contract, what 
would have been the consequences?” 
Lets first explore different types of loan contracts and their characteristics. 
                                                
1 According to Palacios (2004) I have only consulted Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman, 1962). For those interested I have 
included his reference in my reference list. 
2 Students were offered loan base on their parent’s inability to finance their children’s education. 
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1.1 Loan types 
1.1.1 Mortgage Type Loans 
An annuity contract is the type of loan most people are familiar with. This is the traditional 
loan in which you borrow and repay according to a repayment plan that is related to the size 
of the loan. It can come in one of three varieties. First is a straight annuity, which is the loan 
most people are familiar with. With a straight annuity the payments stay the same over time, 
only adjusted by a change in the market interest rate if the loan has a floating interest rate.  
Payments are the same size and are in effect the sum of interest accrued for each period and 
an increasing payment on principal over the repayment period. The second type is a series 
loan. This type of loan has equally sized payments on the principal each period in addition to 
the accrued interest for the period. This results in decreasing size of the payments over the 
payment period. The third type is a modified annuity. This is a loan in which the payments 
grow in size. Sweden uses this type of repayment schedule on their student loan to adjust the 
repayment plan in such a way that the payments are in equal size in real terms, meaning the 
students payments increase in nominal terms, but would have the same purchase power for 
every year of repayment.  
To sum up there are three ways to structure a mortgage loan. The first is a nominally flat 
repayment plan, the second a declining repayment plan and finally a repayment plan where 
the payments grow by some factor, for instance inflation like in Sweden. 
1.1.2 Income-Linked Loans 
The main feature of an income-linked loan is that payment are linked to a fraction of the 
borrower’s future income and not the principal received by the borrower. In essence these 
contract have the same properties as equity, with the only difference being that they last for a 
limited time and that there is an absence of ownership. The absence of ownership worth 
pointing out since the investor only owns a right to a fraction of an individual earnings and 
not the right to direct the individual’s actions. If this condition does not exist these contracts 
would in essence be indentured servitude. 
Income-Linked Loans can be divided into two main categories: Income Contingent Loans  
(ICL) and Human Capital Contracts (HCC). ICLs are essentially loans in which the borrower 
repays a fraction of their earnings until the principal and accrued interest is repaid. Imagine 
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that you borrow one hundred thousand and repay it with 5 percent of your annual earnings 
until the loan is repaid. Every year you would pay your 5 percent. If the payment is less than 
the accrued interest your principal will increase, and visa versa. Now, the length of the 
contract will wary with the size of your earnings. The debt can either be arranged as an 
individual debt or as a group debt as Yale did with the Tuition Postponement Option in the 
seventies. HCCs on the other hand work slightly different from an ICL. You repay the same 
5 percent but over a set contract length, say 20 years. This way high-income graduates will 
repay more than low-income graduates if they are charged the same rate. If one was able to 
charge the fraction of income that would result in the graduate repaying the principle and 
accrued interest in exactly within the length of the contract the two variations would yield 
the same result. Lets call this rate the Correct Contract Rate (CCR). Later in my analysis I 
will calculate the CCR and time it would take different cohorts of graduates to repay their 
Income Contingent Loans at different policy rates3. 
 
Now, what would the reasons be for such contracts to be attractive? Repayment will be of 
the same size relative to the graduate’s income for the whole repayment period. This would 
reduce the risk of repayments restricting the borrower income and certainly reduce the 
likelihood of default. Consider an annuity where the payment size stays constant4 for the 
repayment period. In effect this means that the payments constitute a larger fraction of the 
graduate income in the start of his career when money is thigh and visa versa. After 
                                                
3 A policy rate it a static rate set in the contract by the lender. This is as oppose to a dynamic rate working within agreed 
upon bounds to adjust for inflation or market interest rates. 
4 Given a constant interest rate. 
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graduating college most student face many financial challenges. The will need to obtain a 
place to live, means of transportation and possibly start a family.  
Other relevant benefit would be how this feature would assist entrepreneur when considering 
a new venture, a theme that lately has got a lot of attention in the media and with 
policymakers. Such a repayment schedule would enable both student fresh out of school and 
those with experience to embark on new ventures as the only loan that cannot sell their assets 
to repay5. The fact that they will only have to pay a small fraction of their already small 
income will relieve at least some of the issues that may deter them from taking the risks of 
starting a new venture. 
1.1.2.1 An illustrative example 
In Norway the doctrine has after World War II been that there should be relatively small 
differences in income. This is the result of a redistributive tax system and emergence of what 
is known as a “Scandinavian” welfare state. It is not the subject of this thesis to discuss 
neither this doctrine nor the way the Norwegian government chooses to finance higher 
education, but I believe that it is appropriate to acknowledge that Norway has been ranked as 
the world’s best country to live in by the United Nations (UN 2005) for many years in a row 
now so the doctrine seems to work fairly well. I will therefore only discuss the repayment of 
the student loan given, as is the policy today, and not consider alternatives as such.  
Now this result in, as I will later discuss, less economic benefit for those who pursue higher 
education. I will limit my self to two short examples. 
First I would like to consider Kari. She enjoys working with people and considers one of two 
career choices. Either to become a licensed practical nurse6 which is a diploma she would 
obtain as an alternative in high school7 or to obtain a high school diploma and subsequently 
go for three years to nursing school. The first alternative giving her a three years head start 
with regards to earnings, and the second a sizeable debt. On the following page you will find 
                                                
5 I am referring to the fact that there is no way to sell your education in order repay your loan, as you could with say a 
house. 
6 “hjelpepleier” 
7 This would not give her full quantifications to apply for nursing school 
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a diagram representing relative differences between the two alternatives from starting with 
the year of graduation from college. I show both the nominal difference and the economic 
difference. The first nominal difference is the difference in disposable income after tax and 
loan payments. The economic difference shows the same difference but also correcting for a 
write-off for the alternative cost of lost income8. I have also included the difference if the 
degree is self-financed, which only corrects for the loss in income and no benefits. I would 
like to point out that both professions are with few exceptions publicly employed in Norway 
resulting in a fairly equal income growth9. 
 
It become quite clear that the current system does not imply that a rational person would 
pursue a degree in nursing when there is such an income disadvantage10. Even though an 
income-linked loan only would result in slight difference in disposable income it seems clear 
that it would alleviate some of the inequity in the first part of the career. The kinks in the 
curves indicate the loan obligation ending. 
If we take a second look at a presumably more lucrative career choice employed in the 
private sector and a related blue-collar career what would be the result? I will present a 
similar diagram for a civil engineering student and a construction worker11. Here I have used 
an income growth of 8 percent for both the civil engineer and for the construction worker. I 
                                                
8 I have used the difference in disposable income of the practical nurse and the total financial aid received as an annuity 
over 30 years. The wages used are averages presented in a recent article in the daily news paper Dagbladet 
(http://www.dagbladet.no/dinside/2006/03/16/460879.html) 
9 I have used 4 percent for both. 
10 Even though most nurses are aware that it is not a lucrative career to pursue and therefore hardly would sit down to 
estimate this difference. That said there seem to be no problem with recruitment of nursing students 
(www.samordnaopptak.no, see “poenggrenser”)  
11 Incomes used for the engineer is from my research data and the other is from the Dagbladet article mentioned in the 
footnote on the previous page. 
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would like to point out that the income growth for the construction worker is very volatile, 
but strong union in Norway often result in high result depending on the business cycle. 
Using the same growth rate also gives a better illustration. A lower income growth would 
obviously result in an advantage to the  
civil engineer. 
 
As we see that on average an annuity style repayment plan would result in the worst result. 
The fact that civil engineering is a lucrative career results in this being a career that actually 
would be worth self-financing. With an income growth of 4 percent for construction worker 
the story is much brighter for the engineer12. I will only show the first ten years to illustrate. 
 
Hægeland and Møen (2000) discuss the fact that there seems to be some higher degrees that 
actually have a relative disadvantage to just having a high school diploma. They refer to a 
study by Moen and Semmingsen (1996) with the table below. 
 
                                                
12 I would like to remark that the estimate of 312 800 NOK annually for a construction worker seems rather conservative 
compared to my own expectations and experience of those I know in the business.  According to Statistics Norway the 
average in 2005 was 335 000 annually. This would not 
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Ranking Degree 
Relative Lifetime 
Income 
1 MSc Business/Economics 1,42 
2 Law 1,33 
3 Medical Doctor 1,30 
4 MSc Enginerring 1,23 
5 MSc Science 1,12 
6 BSc Engineering 1,11 
7 BSc Business 1,09 
17 High School 1,00 
18 MSc Education (Lektor) 0,99 
20 MA (Cand.philol) 0,94 
21 BA (Cand.mag, HF) 0,93 
22 BSc  (Lærerhøyskole) 0,89 
23 Nursing 0,87 
Source: Moen og Semmingsen (1996) tablel 4.3. Net discountrate 2 percent 
Hægeland and Moen argue that the reason for these differences may be due to there being a 
greater return on talent is certain occupation. Mean that a talented Lawyer has a greater 
income potential compared to a less talented collage colleague. This may not be the same for 
say nurses, as they do not get paid according to their prowess being public employees. 
The point of these illustrations is, as I will get back to that there are relatively fewer children 
from blue-collar backgrounds pursuing longer degrees in Norway (Fekjær, 2000). Fekjær 
(2000) argues that these children don’t realize the value of education, but could it be that 
they realize how little economic value many of their career choices have? That they realize 
that their parents are rather well of compared to their responsibilities and education? “The 
juice ain’t worth the squeeze”, as the modern proverb goes. I am not going to argue for or 
against these arguments, but this would certainly be an interesting question for further 
research. 
1.1.2.2 Summing up the introduction to Income-Linked Loan 
To sum up income-linked loan have two main forms. Both work through a percentage of the 
borrower’s future income, but the difference is in how the contract terminates. Income 
Contingent Loans terminate when the principal and accrued interest is paid, while a Human 
Capital Contract13 lasts for a set period.  
If we have a constant interest rate (or alternatively a zero real interest rate) combined with 
constant income growth over the contract period an income-linked contract would be 
                                                
13 Some times referred to as a graduate tax, though this implies that it is for life and imposed by the government. 
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equivalent to a modified annuity in which the growth rate is equal to the income growth rate. 
This is the link between the two main contract-forms discuss in this thesis. Of course such a 
condition would never hold in real life, as no one would be able knows someone’s average 
income growth ex ante.  
I will discuss these contracts in more detail and relate them to Norwegian conditions later in 
this text, but lets first review the history and experience of different experiment with income-
linked contract so far. 
1.2 History 
In this section I will briefly explain the origin of the idea of Income-Linked Loans and 
discuss different implementations of such contracts. The main objective of this section is to, 
through examples, explained different variations of these contracts, how they were 
implemented, and the lessons learned. It is not indented to be exhaustive discussion with 
regards to the examples given, but rather an introduction as such to these contracts through 
examples14.  
1.2.1 Milton Friedman and the origin of an idea 
According to Palacios (2004, 41) Milton Friedman introduced the idea of committing a 
fraction of ones future income in exchange for financing education in a footnote in Income 
from Independent Professional Practice (Friedman and Kuznets, 1945)15. In its simplest 
form an investor would “buy” a fraction of a students future income. Friedman wrote: 
The device adopted to meet the corresponding problem for other risky investments [not related to 
education] is equity investment plus limited liability on the part of the shareholders. The counterpart 
would be to “buy” a share in an individual’s earning prospects. (Friedman, 1962, 103) 
From this spun ideas, which in this text are referred to as Income-Linked Loans that now are 
divided into Income Contingent Loans (ICL) and Human Capital Contracts (HCC). 
Friedman forwarded the idea with reference to vocational and professional school as oppose 
to general education for citizenship. He argues that this type of training has no neighborhood 
                                                
14 Palacios (2004), Barr (2005, 2001, 1989) and Johnstone (xxx) all have thorough discussions of previous implementations 
until their volumes were written.  
15 I have not been able to obtain this text, and have only consulted Friedmans volume Capitalism and Freedom 
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effects16 like those that can be attributed to general education. This he claims in effect makes 
an investment in human capital analogous to that of investment in real capital such as 
machinery or buildings. The individual will receive a higher return on his services then what 
he otherwise would be able to. He also correctly points out that major cost of vocational and 
professional schooling is forgone income in the period of training, interest lost by 
postponing the earning period and the expenses related to acquiring the education. Compared 
to the erection of a building the investor would have a similar loss of interest in during 
construction. Both investments would be carried through if the investor believes the extra 
return is worth the cost.  
Friedman also argue that if capital was equally available to invest in human capital and real 
capital the rate of return would be roughly the same in the two fields, and that an 
underinvestment in human capital would reflect an imperfection in the capital market. He 
explains this by the fact that an investment in real assets would give the investor an 
opportunity to realize part of his investment in the event of default. Hence, referring to the 
fact that investors would be able to obtain collateral for their investment in real asset, while 
this would not be possible in the case of human capital. As he points out:  
In a non-slave state, the human being embodying the investment cannot be bought and sold. Even if 
he could, the security would not be comparable. The productivity of the physical capital does not in 
general depend on the cooperativeness of the original borrower. The productivity of the human 
capital quite obviously does. (Friedman. 1962, 102) 
Now in light of this fact he argues that a the type of fixed payment loan used for the 
financing of for instance the erection of a building would be an inappropriate form of 
financing for development of human capital. Event though the average expected return 
would be high. There would be great variation between individuals and therefore much risk 
involved. In addition there is the risk of death or physical incapacity. 
Lets compare Friedman’s proposition to a startup firm. An investor faces many of the same 
issues when backing a startup company developing for instance new technology. Until the 
company obtains a patent the investor faces the risk of never recovering his investment. He 
would also need cooperation from those developing the company’s product or technology. In 
                                                
16 Forklaring på neighborhood effects og referanse 
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the event of irreconcilable disagreement between the employee of the company the company 
may “die” as there is no one to complete the development of the product or technology into 
some entity that can be sold, for instance some sort of Intellectual Property Right. If the 
researchers walk out on the project they take the knowledge with them. In the beginning of a 
company’s life it also experiences tight budgets and what is commonly known as the J-
curve17. Venture Capitalists backing startup firms usually offer funds in return for equity in 
the company. The financiers do not further the financial stress on the company, and therefore 
increase the company’s chance of survival and their own excess returns. 
This analogy serves two purposes. First it explains the similar properties of financing 
startups and human capital and therefore increases the amount of available theory that can be 
applied. Second this similarity should indicate that the structure of this financing human 
capital should be similar to that of new venture as well. It is important though to remember 
that there is one significant difference between the two. Venture Capitalist have the 
opportunity to control and direct their investment. They tend to want a significant share of 
the company’s equity in order to have some control of how the funds are spent and the 
strategy of the company. This type of control is not possible with regards to human capital, 
as slavery most likely (and hopefully) never will become an option. Another significant 
difference is the perspective of the investors. Most graduate have an average of 35 year of 
productive life18. A company can in theory last forever. Venture Capitalist tend to exit 
companies within 5-10 year. These differences indicate an instrument that is similar though 
not identical to equity. 
Friedman points out that the reason that such contracts do not exist must be due to the high 
administration cost of obtaining correct income statements, since there is no limitation on an 
individual’s mobility. This point probably was more relevant in the sixties that it is today. In 
the case of Norway information on tax returns would easily be available to anyone that 
would issue such a contract. The collection methods will be discussed below in the examples 
below.  
                                                
17 This is a curve that describes the net income of a firm over its lifespan. This curve has the sharp of the letter J, or the 
hockey stick, as it is some times also referred to as. The point being that a firm usually has negative income in the first 
period of its life. 
18 OECD (2005)  average 
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Another interesting point that might be relevant to Norway is that because of marked 
imperfection there is an underinvestment in human capital. This may justify government 
intervention (Friedman, 1962, 104), but how should this be done? He argues that if the 
government subsidizes to the point that anyone meeting minimum quality standards could 
get training, there would tend to be an over investment in human capital. In Norway 
vocational training is available under these conditions. Anyone that meets minimum grade 
requirements can obtain some sort of vocational training, and Norwegian colleges do not 
charge their students tuition. Hence, vocational training is subsidized to the point where 
anyone seeking vocational training can obtain it. This I have already treated above. 
Friedman’s idea set of the imagination of many economists and policymaker. Several 
experiments with Income Contingent Repayment Schemes were initiated. These experiments 
where structured as loans, which is now conventionally called Income Contingent Loans 
(ICL). Palacios (2004, 43) speculates that this was due to the fact that Friedman referred 
those “buying” a share of an individual’s earning prospects as “lenders”, rather then 
investors.  
1.2.2 The Yale University Tuition Postponement Option 
In 1971 Yale University initiated something they called the Tuition Postponement Option. 
This was a program that let the students pay their tuition by committing a fraction of their 
future earnings. It was devised as an alternative to students that found their financing options 
shrinking due to government cuts in the amount of loans and grants offered. The program 
was designed to last until 1976, but students that joined the university prior to 1976 were 
allowed to continue the program until graduation (Palacios, 2004, 124).  
Description of the program
19
 
The Yale program had two distinct features separating it from other programs at the time. 
First, the payments were income contingent. Second, the borrowers were grouped in to 
cohorts that were mutually responsible for their group’s collective debt. This was in order to 
create a mutual responsibility among classmates to repay their obligation. 
                                                
19 This is a summary of the description in Palacios (2004) 
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The first feature stated that the student would pay 0,4% of their annual income for each 1000 
dollars. These payments would as described earlier be used to pay the accrued interest and a 
payment on the principal20. Payments lower than the accrued interest would instead increase 
the principal. The interest on the loan would be variable and reflect Yale’s own cost of 
capital. 
The second feature, the more controversial one, grouped the students into cohorts. The 
reason it turned out to be controversial was that students defaulting on their loan effectively 
pushed their loan onto the other cohort members. This in turn would make the remaining 
cohort members more likely to default. The grouping of loans also redistributed loan from 
low-income earner to high-income earners. These cohorts where created randomly, and so 
there is no reason to believe that there are any significant differences between them. The 
redistribution was not unlimited as an individual obligation was limited to 150 percent of 
their debt plus accrued interest. This was also offered as a “buy out” option to students who 
did not wish to continue the program. Another important feature was that that the obligation 
would last no more than 35 years, but it was expected that most cohorts would finish much 
before that. 
Problems and lessons learned from Yale’s repayment plan 
According to Palacios (2004) the two main problems related to the Yale Tuition 
Postponement Option were related to each other. High default rates spawned negative public 
opinion, which again did not help the default rates. Yale’s default rate was as high as 15 
percent, which of course was way above the expectation. The absence of effective group 
pressure on those who did not pay meant that there was nothing to gain from honoring the 
contract. In addition there was a change in the law in 1986 that removed the tax deductibility 
of the loan, effectively making the loan even more unattractive.  
                                                
20 These could be negative payment in the beginning of the repayment period. 
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The lessons learn from Yale’s experiment: 
1. The time frame of 35 years repayment created a feeling of “perpetual obligation”.  
2. A lack of understanding of the time value of money since the graduate had to 
repay many time the value nominal value of their tuition. 
3. The redistributive nature of the loan as we have already discuss. 
4. The collection agency in that Yale is not a bank, but rather a university and hence its 
expertise is not to collect debt. 
The timeframe in effect correspond to length of the graduate’s productive life. That 
combined with high default rates meant that most of the students would have to pay this 
“extra tax” until they retired. This generated negative feelings and incentives to default on 
the loan. Palacios (2004, 127) argues that shorter periods of time have a disadvantage, since 
the profits of education come during the whole period of someone productive life. He 
therefore argues that repaying in a shorter period creates a “higher-then-needed financial 
burden”, and that it makes more financial sense to let the repayment period be equal that of 
productive life. I would like to argue two points. First, in theory a repayment period equal to 
that of productive life might make financial sense, but this will effect let the principal grow 
depending on the market rate applied substantially beyond its initial nominal value. With an 
expected income growth and interest rate of 8 percent and 8,5 percent respectfully found in 
my analysis this would in effect result in the principal more than doubling and actual 
repayment on principal does not occur until the last 5 years of the 35 year repayment 
period21. This would in effect most likely result in massive default rates unless the contract 
rate was set higher than necessary. A longer contract rate I argue would constitute more risk 
for the investor hence a higher cost of capital, which amplify results in the unwanted effect 
just described. Also a pragmatic approach to the rate applied is to charge according to a 
shorter term, thus leaving slack22. The second point I would like to make is that the property 
that makes Income-Linked Loans interesting is that they let the payments grow with the 
borrowers earnings. Would it not be reasonable to believe that income would grow more in 
                                                
21 These projections are made with the Correct Contract Rate and static income growth and interest rate. 
22 This would only apply to income contingent loans. 
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the beginning of a graduate’s career, and that growth would decline as the borrower 
approached retirement? The data in my analysis is indicates this, but there are too few 
observations to conclude from them. This also fits with a Mincerian Human Capital Earning 
Function (Mincer, 1974) that I will get back to. 
The second lesson from the Yale experiment was the psychological effect of paying many 
times the value of the nominal value of the tuition. Palacios (2004, 124) argues that there are 
many ways to reduce this effect, but points out that this is just a psychological factor and that 
using a below market interest rate would need someone to cover the low risk-adjusted rate. 
He goes on to point out that the most sensible solution is to educate the borrower and 
removing the effect altogether. 
The third lesson earned the Yale experiment its growing public perception of inequity. The 
fact that those who honored their contract ended up as losers seems unreasonable and in 
conjunction with the fact that most of the borrowers did not understand the time value of 
money this probably generated even greater feelings of inequity. 
The fourth lesson was that Yale showed that they lacked competency to collect the 
payments. Yale is an academic institution and should have left this work to a financial 
institution. 
1.2.3 Australia’s Higher-Education Contribution Scheme23 
In 1989 the Australian government radically changed its education policy on higher 
education. They implemented an Income Contingent Repayment Scheme (ICRS) with the 
taxation office, as it’s collecting agency. In order to see how this policy change came about 
we need to review Australia’s financial situation at the time.  
The government primarily operates Australia’s higher-education sector and decides fees, 
which all students are subject to. Prior to 1974 those fees represented 25% of the total costs, 
the rest was subsidized the government. In 1974 all fees on higher education where 
abolished, and the burden of educational cost were carried by the government.   
                                                
23 This is a summary of Palacios (2004, 131) 
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According to Palacios (2004) three factors made the Australian government rethink its 
position: 
1. Increasing demand for higher education 
2. Increasingly negative public view of state-financed higher education 
3. A tide of liberalization that questioned the regional government spending in several 
areas, including education. 
The first factor was tied to the increasing number of students graduating high school. This 
would presumably in time increase the number of student entering tertiary education. This 
pose an increase in the budget need for higher education. This pressure threatened the 
current system unsustainable. 
The second factor was due to the view that financing of higher education through tax 
revenue was extremely regressive. The critics argued that because an only a fraction of the 
population attended the tertiary education, and those that did often also enjoyed higher 
incomes thereafter. Hence, public financing of higher education received resources from 
everyone, including the majority that did not enjoy the benefits of higher education. The 
argument was that everyone invested in those that would enjoy higher average income upon 
entering the job market.  
The third factor is closely linked to the previous factor as Australia faced the problem of 
reintroducing fees without erecting financial barriers for disadvantaged students. The two 
main reasons that there is an inefficient capital market for financing education is the lack of 
collateral and high collection costs as mentioned earlier. In the absence of such a market they 
considered an Income Contingent Loan type contract. This option was considered as it 
provided a viable alternative that would enable introducing fees without affecting the low-
income students negatively.  
Although there had been published theoretical work on the idea this was the first time it had 
been applied on a countrywide scale. It was suggested that the Australian taxation office 
would collect the loan. The Wran committee24 that suggested the scheme faced considerable 
                                                
24I have been unable to obtain this rapport and as such this is reference forwarded from my other references such as Barr 
and Palacios. 
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resistance as there was raised questions of whether it would work or not, and if it would 
actually help those it was intended to help (Wran, 1988). In addition the tax office opposed 
their involvement, as they did not see it as their responsibility to collect debts. A third issue 
that was argued was that this scheme did not resolve the government immediate financing 
needs. 
The first to points where resistance to novelty. The third issue was solved through offering a 
discount to those that were able to make upfront payments (see Wran 1988; Edwards, 
Howard and Miller, 2002)25. 
When the Higher Education Contribution Scheme was implemented there was to important 
question that need to be answered.  
1. How much should be charged as a fee? 
2. Should there be different fee for different educational programs? 
The first question is really concerning how large the neighborhood effects or positive 
externalities are. That is how much of the benefits of education for instance a doctor is 
enjoyed by his “neighborhood” versus the doctor himself. Everyone benefits from having 
access to a doctor, but the doctor also enjoys a higher income and most likely social status in 
his community. It this neighborhood effect is undervalued it would result in too much of the 
cost of education to fall on the student and hence an underinvestment in would be the result. 
Neighborhood effects are difficult to quantify, and covering 100 percent would cover more 
than this effect. 
The second question related to whether a medical and accounting student should face the 
same fees. According Bruce Chapman (1997) the average cost of training a medical student 
is about five times that of non-clinical program such as accounting or law.  
The way these issues were solved by a search for simplicity. One fee was to be charged at 
approximately 20-25 percent of the average cost of a full time student. The number was 
                                                
25 I have been unable to obtain this volume and as such this is reference forwarded from my other references such as Barr 
and Palacios. 
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according to Palacios determined arbitrary, and was based on the fees charged prior to the 
1974 reform. 
There are two additional factors that need to be determined. First you would need to decide 
how to handle the interest rate. They choose to set the real interest rate to zero, which in 
effect would only adjust the principle by the rate of inflation. This was to avoid a debt 
accumulation similar to that of the Yale experiment. This meant that those that repaid slowly 
received a subsidy compared to those that repaid fast. This was implied implicitly as those 
that repaid slower benefited from the zero real interest for a longer period.  
Secondly they need to decide on the repayment schedule. As we discuss earlier a stronger 
expected income growth warrants a lower contract rate, but that does not necessarily gain the 
effect wanted by policymaker and investors. This would imply that those with higher 
incomes could pay a smaller fraction of their income in order to repay their debt. In the case 
of Australia they choose to use a progressive rate that increased with your taxable income. If 
your income were below a certain level the rate would be zero. This way it would not place a 
burden on low-income earners. The payments would also last for as long as the graduate had 
an income or a remaining balance. To create an incentive to pay fees upon enrollment the 
students were offered a 25 percent discount if the fees were paid upfront. As will be discuss 
later this actually would be warranted, as the discount would essentially be the value of the 
option value of the Income Contingent Loan26.  
Lessons learned from the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
Palacios list two important lesson of why the system appear to be a success: 
1. An efficient collection system 
2. It showed that the immediate need for funds could be overcome. 
Using the Australian Tax Office as the collection agency proved very efficient, reliable and 
cost-effective. Collection of payments that are income-linked is very expensive for private 
institutions. This is most evident with the Yale experiment. The collection of student loans 
                                                
26 Human Capital Options discuss below. 
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through the income tax system seems both efficient and maximizes the main argument for 
pursuing these schemes.  
Edwards, Howard and Miller (2002)27 describes the Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
as a painless method of (re)introducing tuition charges in higher education. 
The second lesson is essentially related to Palacios (2003) working paper an idea that he also 
presents in his book Investing in Human Capital of creating an option on an individuals 
income over a certain period. He argues that the discount given to students that pay the fee 
upfront could be seen at the size of the premium on such a contract. The theory of Human 
Capital Options (HCO) will be discussed below. 
1.2.4 Sweden28 
Sweden initiated an Income Contingent Loan scheme in 1989, but adopted a very different 
model from the Australian scheme. Sweden is very similar to Norway in that the state covers 
university tuition, as well as social structure, and is therefore especially interesting when 
analyzing Income-Linked Loans. The Swedish scheme consisted of a grant and a loan. The 
loan was to be repaid in the form of an ICL contract by a flat rate of 4 percent of the 
graduate’s annual income. The principal was to carry an interest rate set annually by the 
government, which should be “equivalent to the cost of capital for the government during the 
last three years”. Essentially the interest rate applied is the rate given by the Bank of Sweden 
adjusted for the income tax advantage of debt29. The scheme has no definite contract period, 
which can be interpreted as being equivalent to the HECS scheme. Palacios (2004) claims 
that the Swedish implementation is “usually considered successful”, but considering that the 
scheme was terminated in 2001, in favor of a modified annuity30, this can hardly be the case.   
 
 
                                                
27 I have not been able to obtain a copy of this volume and as such this is a reference given by Palacios (2004) 
28 This is based on the information provided on http://www.csn.se 
29 That adjustment is equivalent to a 30 percent tax discount according to http://www.csn.se 
30 As mentioned earlier this annuity grows by the target inflation rate of 2 percent. 
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The scheme was terminated due to much criticism. The main points forwarded in the 
Swedish parliament were these six points31: (1) Many students took on debt that it would be 
unrealistic to repay. Mainly due to a lack of understanding of how these contracts work. (2) 
Debt speculation – the graduates lacked incentives so that they would limit how much debt 
they accumulated each semester. In effect borrowing more than they needed. (3) The system 
was difficult to apprehend for most student and no alternative contracts were offered. (4) The 
scheme did not encourage the student to finish their education on time. The scheme lacked 
incentives as such. (5) Accrued interest tends to build over time, as we discuss earlier with 
longer periods of repayment. The critics claim that this meant the average student would not 
be able to pay off the loan within a reasonable timeframe. (6) The financial aid provided had 
a structure that offered unreasonably different terms for students to complete their education. 
This resulted in termination in 2001, returning to a mortgage type arrangement with rather 
strict terms. CSN32 now imposes shorter repayment schedules, but offers a “safety rule”33, 
which graduate with low income could apply to be considered for. This rule states that those 
accepted will limit their payments to 5 percent of their annual income. If the debt is not 
repaid at age 50 the graduate is subject to a 7 percent rate. 
It seems quite clear that the lack of differentiation of rates given in the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme seems to have lower the student’s attitude towards their student loan. 
They seem to have regarded it as an additional tax and therefore would enjoy student life for 
as long as possible.  
1.2.5 Other examples 
In addition to the examples mentioned above I am going to quickly mention a few other 
countries and private initiatives that have initiated Income-Linked Loans schemes.  
New Zealand introduced its Income Contingent Loan program in 1991. Although similar to 
the Australian scheme, this is probably the program that most closely resembles a marked-
based loan. A few of the significant differences to the Higher Education Contribution 
                                                
31 Motion 1999/2000:Ub10  (http://www.riksdagen.se)  
32 The Swedish National Board of Student Aid 
33 “Trygghetsregeln” (http;//www.csn.se) 
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Scheme were; the intention of the program was to improve the universities response to 
demand from students34. This program also applied the market rate on the principal. This 
was heavily criticized, which resulted the government reducing the interest rate to zero while 
the students were in school. 
Chile implemented an Income Contingent Loan scheme to finance students in 1994. The 
loan carries a 2 percent real interest rate and lets the graduate pay the lesser of a fixed 
payment and 5 percent of his annual income. The contract length is 12 or 15 years depending 
on the remaining balance in year twelve of repayment. The loan is available depending on 
the student’s background. According to Palacios (2004,141) this program is considered 
successful. 
Ghana also implemented an Income Contingent Loan program in 1989. This is worth 
mentioning due to its interesting collection and repayment scheme. The program was 
intended to cover living expenses, which makes it equivalent to the educational system of the 
Scandinavian countries. Collection of repayment is made through the social security system. 
It does not constitute of an additional tax, but the student loan payments takes precedence 
over the accumulation of retirement funds. Most graduates accumulate maximum retirement 
benefits before retirement age, but continue making payments until retirement. The system 
had been question for its lacking capacity to generate additional revenue for the state. There 
is also an interest rate subsidy on the loan, which results in the graduates only paying back a 
fraction of the original amount given to them. 
Some private initiatives worth mentioning are MyRichUncle.com and Robertson Education 
Empowerment Foundation.  
MyRichUncle.com is probably the most renown of the two. They started their work on the 
investment in human capital in 1999. They are mention in most news articles and other 
literature on the subject, like Robert Shiller’s volume The New Financial Order35. When 
trying to find information on them it seems that they have turned to a fixed payment 
repayment schedule, with an option of deferring payments. Every reference I have pursued 
                                                
34 The universities were allowed to vary the amount charge to each student. 
35 Shiller (2003) 
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has been unsuccessful with regards to Income-Linked Loan schemes and this leads me to 
believe that they have either put their offer of contracts on hold or terminated this scheme.  
The Robertson Education Empowerment Foundation36 began its Educational Investment 
program in the fall of 2002 at the University of California, San Diego campus, with an initial 
investment of 3 million dollars. It is intended to grow over time to enable future generation 
of students attending University of California system to benefit from it. To be eligible you 
need to be a US citizen, attend University of California full time and maintain a 3.0 grade 
point average. The contracts have variable rates beginning at 0,20 percent of gross income 
for every thousand invested for undergraduates and 0,10 percent for graduates for a period of 
15 and 10 years accordingly. The rates are set according to an evaluation of potential and 
past merits. There is also a buyout option after three years of consecutive payments. 
                                                
36 http://www.aboutreef.org 
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2. Current theory on Income-Linked Loans and their 
variables 
In this section I will try to illuminate theoretical aspect of Income-Linked Loans. I will start 
with a discussion of market failures related to education, moving on to a presentation of the 
more technical aspects of the these contracts.  
2.1 Market failure in the financing of education 
According to economic theory competitive markets fail for four reasons: market power, 
incomplete information, externalities and public goods37. Of these reasons those most likely 
to appear in the financing of education is the problem of incomplete information and 
externalities. I will start of with a discussion of how this affects the borrower, and then move 
onto the lenders. The sum of this discussion is that a government guarantee and subsidy is 
need in order for these two problems resolve. 
2.1.1 Risks and uncertainty facing the borrower 
Investing in human capital is risky for the individual. He faces many risks and a high degree 
of uncertainty in borrowing in order to obtain a degree. It is instructive to adopt Barr’s 
(2001, 175) comparison to lending toward buying a house. Now lets consider five point of 
comparison: 
1. Unknown benefits: When buying a house the borrower presumably knows what he 
is buying. He has lived in one his whole life and a buildings engineer can easily 
verify the condition of the house. This is not the case with higher education. He does 
not personally have any experience with higher education, and there might not be 
anyone in his family with a higher degree. The benefits may not seem clear to the 
student. 
2. Uncertain value: The house is unlikely to fall down. When the house is bought the 
own will not need to by another one. A student on the other hand could be unable to 
complete the degree. It might also be necessary to pursue further education. 
                                                
37 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001) 
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3. Need for reinvestment: The value of a home will generally increase. A college 
degree on the other hand will loose its value over time. It may for instance be 
rendered obsolete by new technology. 
4. Illiquid investment: If the homeowner’s income falls or it for some reason becomes 
burdensome to make the payments on the mortgage, the owner can always sell the 
house. A college degree on the other hand is impossible to sell, as it would entail 
slavery. 
5. Cannot be collateralized: When borrowing to buy a house, it can serve as collateral. 
That way if the borrower defaults on the loan the lender can recover most of the debt. 
This on the other hand is not possible with a student loan as the value is the future 
proceeds of that individual. This risk will therefore have to be reflected in the interest 
rate applied to the loan. 
 
Faced with these uncertainties the risk averse38 student is less likely to invest in education. 
That essentially means that if an individual is from a family or neighborhood where no one 
has a higher degree that individual would have to be willing to take, to him, unknown risks 
in order to obtain a degree instead of receiving a steady income like everyone else he knows. 
Palacios (2004, 25) shows that there is very likely that a degree will result in a higher income 
in the U.S.A. compared to those without a high school diploma. This is likely to be similar 
on average for Norway all though it would be reasonable to expect the variance would be 
smaller and the distance between the average incomes to be smaller. I have not been able to 
obtain any statistic to support this argument, as it has not reported by Statistics Norway39 nor 
been to my knowledge published any research related to this question. That said students in 
Norway only face the loss of earnings while obtaining a degree and the cost of interest on 
their living expenses. 
2.1.2 Lenders risks and uncertainty 
Governments represent presently most lenders; this means that they often are controlled by 
policy and public opinion rather then business sense. The possibility of private investors in 
education will be limited by the how great the following problems are perceived. For the 
                                                
38 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001) define it as: prefering a certain income to a risky income with the same expected value. 
39 I did suggest it to them and it will most likly be made, although not in time for me to recent in thesis. 
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purpose of this thesis these point are as I mentioned earlier not relevant, as the topic of this 
thesis is not the higher education policy of Norway only the repayment scheme applied. Lets 
continue with the comparison of buying a house. First consider the asymmetric information 
facing the lender: 
Asymmetric information When providing a financing for someone to purchase a house the 
lender knows very well what they are helping finance. This is due to real estate being 
relatively easy to value. Education on the other hand it quite difficult to value. The lender is 
missing loads of information necessary to value the investment. Even the student does not 
know all the information necessary, merely his own intentions. This is very likely to result in 
the well-known problem of adverse selection40 particularly in the absence of a (government) 
guarantee. Because the lenders do not know each individuals intentions and abilities they are 
likely to charge a rate above what the best students will consider fair. This will result in these 
students finding other sources of financing. This again results in the lenders over time 
adjusting their rate up to their new expected rate. This will result in additional of group 
seeking other source of financing. The cycle will repeat it self until only the worst students 
remain. Another problem is moral hazard. This is the risk faced by lenders that individuals 
choose not to honor their contract. We see clear examples of this in the Yale experiment. 
Students choose to default, and because of the group structure of the loan this results in even 
more student choosing not to repay their loans. If the house owner chooses not to make a 
payment on the loan the investor knows where to find him. 
Difficulty in collecting payment: A bank can feel fairly confident that a house will remain 
at its current address. Graduates on the other hand tend to move around. The fact that they do 
is actually to their mutual benefit as it creates better opportunities for the graduate to 
increase his earnings. It does however make it more difficult for the investor to track his 
earnings and collect payments.  
Uncertain value, illiquid investments, and the absence collateral:  These concerns are 
equivalent to those of the borrower. They all warrant higher rates as the investor faces a 
greater risk and more uncertainty. 
                                                
40 Akerlof (1970) paper on market for lemons 
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2.1.3 Externalities 
An externality is the result of effect of transaction between to parties which are nota 
transaction indirectly affects others (positive or negative) without being reflected directly in 
the marked price. In the case of a higher education this would be represented by a positive 
externality. I have already mentioned these effects as neighborhood effects. When a student 
trains to become a doctor this will not only benefit himself, but also his community. The 
availability of his services will affect his community positively as it is a benefit to have 
access to a doctor in case of illness. This is a social cost of training the doctor, and should be 
born by society. These social benefits should result in society paying the accompanied social 
cost. Thus the individual should pay the private cost. For Norway this, as I have indicated 
earlier, can in economic terms be relatively small. 
2.2 Income-Linked Loans 
So far I have avoided the technical aspect of these contracts. They have been explained in 
less technical terms as I have tried to avoid mathematical formulas. In this section I will 
introduce these aspects of Income-Linked Loans. So far I have mentioned two types of 
contracts; (1) Income Contingent Loans, which charges a rate on gross income until the 
principal plus accrued interest is repaid and (2) Human Capital Contracts, which charges a 
rate on gross income for the duration of it’s contract period. In addition to these two 
contracts I will introduce Palacios’ (2004) Human Capital Option. My analysis will not treat 
these options per se, but as this is an important contribution I will present them here. Human 
Capital Options are essentially a tool that can yield the same result as the Correct Contract 
Rate41 on either an Income Contingent Loan or a Human Capital Contract as a whole. The 
Correct Contract Rates of different cohort are estimate in my analysis. 
Lets summarize the discussion of Income-Linked Loans (ILL) so far. An Income-Linked 
Loan is a contract that lends funds to an individual with a commitment from that individual 
to repay his debt through as a fraction of his future income for a period of time. In our case 
this is financing of higher education. This could just as easy apply to other loans Shiller 
(2003) argues, but these applications will not be discussed in this text.  
                                                
41 The rate at which the loan is exactly repaid within it’s repayment length. 
 29
These contracts can be divided into to main groups: Income Contingent Loans – which runs 
until the loan is repaid, and Human Capital Contracts – which runs for a set period of time. 
Both will have a specified percentage or rate attached to them. If we had perfect information 
about the individual’s future income and the marked rate we could estimate a Correct 
Contract Rate for such contracts and charge this for each individual. Even though it is not 
possible to obtain such information, the Correct Contract Rate of an individual would render 
the two contract types identical. Most of the literature does not discuss the topic of the 
contract rate. Most of the discussions around Income Contingent Loans only reflect on the 
repayment period, and in the case of Australia they applied a progressive rate, so that high-
income earners had a higher rate than low-income earners. Palacios (2004) is the first to 
touch upon this subject, but his point of view is the opposite of what I initially considered for 
this thesis42. He decides the rate and then estimates the present value of an individual’s 
income to price the amount the lender is able to offer that individual for a certain period of 
time. That is he applies a typical equity research valuation approach to his idea of HCC.  
My initial approach was from the opposite direction. I wanted to research what a Correct 
Contract Rate would be historically, and what effect such a rate would have. The 
Scandinavian tradition of financial aid dates back more than thirty years. It has generally 
been provided as a mortgage type loan, with the exception of Sweden from 1989 to 2001. 
Financial aid is provided non discriminatory to any student who applies for it. All students 
receive the same amount of financial aid43. The Correct Contract Rates will be estimated for 
each class of Norwegian engineer and business graduates from the seventies until present.  
As I will be handling historic data I do not need a model for future income in my analysis, 
and the data I have had access to did not provide an opportunity to estimate coefficient for 
such a model.  
 
 
                                                
42 I only discovered Palacios and most of the literature toward the end of writing this thesis. 
43 Every student in Norway is eligible for student loans, but grant are only award to student that work earn less than a set 
amount annually or has a substantial fortune. These requirements are currently at 113 027 NOK and 223 600 NOK 
accordingly. 
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2.2.1 Basic valuation  
One of the fundamental concepts in finance is the time value of money. This describes the 
fact that holding $20 bill to day is better than the promise of one tomorrow. This is the 
rationale for charging interest44. This implies that we have to calculate the alternative cost of 
lending money. In an income-linked loan contract there are five basic variables: the principal  
(the amount borrowed), the income, the contract rate (the percentage of the income paid to 
the lender), the interest rate on the principal and the income growth rate. Now for anyone 
that has a little knowledge of equity valuation this should seem rather familiar. Lets just 
relate this to one of the most well known formula in valuation, the Gordon growth formula45.  
P0 =
Div0
k  g
=
d  E0
k  g
   
Which states that the present value (P0) of a business entity is the dividend (Div0) divided by 
the cost of capital (k) minus the growth in the dividend or earnings  (g). In other words the 
percentage (d) of the income (E0) paid per period to the lender (owner of the share) divided 
by the relevant interest rate minus the income growth. Now this is essentially Palacios 
(2004) model. He uses the Mincer (1974) Human Capital Earnings Function46 to estimate the 
present value of income, and explicitly includes administration costs, default costs and 
unemployment. His approach is that an investor would estimate the present value of the 
borrowers future income and offer price on that contract based on the percentage charged. 
2.2.2 Estimating The Correct Contract Rate  
My approach is contrary to Palacios. I look at the financing need to complete the degree. 
From this I estimate what rate needs to be charged. The difference in orientation is probably 
due to the fact that I am used to the Scandinavian tradition where financial aid only covers 
living expenses and not tuition, which is covered by the government. Hence the amount 
needed is less, and no upper limit on funds need as such is likely to be reached.  
                                                
44 For a more detailed discussion of the time value of money and discounted cash flows consult any finance text. Principles 
of Corporate Finance by Brealey Myers & Allen (2005) is an excellent example. 
45 See Gordon & Shapiro (1956) 
46 I am not presenting this theory, as it is rather technical and will not be used in my analysis. It is worth mentioning that 
Mincer’s framework seems highly accepted, as I have found it in most of the relevant literature. Thus it seems to be 
appropriate to apply it to these type of contracts. 
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If we then rearrange the Gordon growth formula with regards to the percentage of income 
paid out we get  
P0 = d 
E0
k  g
 d = P0E0
kg
=
P0
PV (E)
 
Hence the correct percentage of the earnings (dividend payout ratio) needs to be the fraction 
the price of the security is of the present value of the earnings. Translated in to income-
linked loan contract terms. This means that the Correct Contract Rate is the fraction the 
initial principal debt (D0) make out of the present value of that individual’s future income
47. 
CCR =
D0
PV (y)
 
Now since the point of this contract is to repay it, within a limited timeframe, we will need 
to discount the projected cash flow for the contract period. The way this is done is to 
discount each year’s income by the compounded interest rate previously incurred from the 
initial point at which the principal was paid out. Using this method on ex post data you are 
able to calculate the Correct Contract Rate (CCR) for Income-Linked Loans48.  
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Here  denotes the income growth rate. The second model uses t to denote the initial year 
and T to denote the length of the contract in both. 
 
                                                
47 This is the percentage of the student’s future income that would result in no profit or loss to the investor. 
48 For derivation of this formula using a difference equation approach see Appendix A 
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2.2.3 Human Capital Options49 
An option contract works like an insurance contract, where someone pays another to carry 
his risk. If the event does not occur the insurer makes a profit from the contract, otherwise 
the insurer will need to pay out according to the terms of the contract. Options are essentially 
insurance policies on the price and volume of a product.  
Option contracts come in two forms puts and calls. Puts are guarantees to achieve a certain 
minimum price, while calls guarantees a certain maximum price. That is to say if the price at 
the time the contract matures is above the agreed put strike (agreed minimum) price or below 
the call strike (agreed maximum) price you will not need the insurance, as you are better of 
not using either of the contracts. Hence the issuer earns his premium, the price you paid for 
the insurance or option. 
Palacios (2004, ch. 7) introduced Human Capital Options50 (HCO) as a way to reduce the 
risks of income-linked loan contracts. Human Capital Options are insurance on the present 
value of someone’s income over the contract period. The combination of either a flexible 
loan51 and a HCO put52, or a HCC and a HCO call53 would be the equivalent of an Income 
Contingent Loan or a Human Capital Contract with overpayment insurance. 
The borrower would decide to pay a certain percentage of his income for the contract period, 
and buy a put on the same percentage of the expected present value his income for the period 
in question. This would mean that if his income became higher than he expected for the 
period he would repay the loan quicker than expected. In the event that he exaggerated his 
expected income (that is paid a smaller percentage than needed) the put would cover the 
difference at maturity.  
                                                
49 This section is not meant as a full discussion of Human Capital Options or option theory in general. It is only intended to 
illuminate the existence of the idea and its significance. As I will not use this theory in my analysis I only present the 
general idea here. For a thorough discussion se Palacios (2004) 
50 Palacios uses Black-Scholes option pricing, see Palacios (2004, Appendix B) and Black Scholes (1973) 
51 A loan where the borrower chooses how to handle both principal and accrued interest until the loan matures.  
52 A put is a minimum income insurance contract. 
53 A call is an insurance against overpaying on the Human Capital Contract in case of great success. 
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The Human Capital Contract combined with a HCO call work the opposite way. If he earns 
more than expected he would be able to reclaim the excess earnings through the call option. 
This is protection against what Barr (2001, 218) calls the Mick Jagger problem54. Mick 
Jagger was an accounting student at LSE prior to his fame and fortune. Now it is reasonable 
to say that his wealth is not related to his education. Neither would paying a fraction of his 
income for say 15 years be fair relative to what skills he acquired with the loan. Given that 
he had sign a Human Capital Option he would avoid overpaying on his obligation.  
It is also important to point out that the same investors or financial institutions need not offer 
both contracts. Hence a student could get a HCC from one bank and the HCO from another. 
Another point that should be made is that this kind of protection much easier to obtain by 
capping the terms of the contract. Say that the contract rate is calculated on the average of 
the student of the class with all students in the 90th percentile counted at the income of the 
90th percentile. This could also be done with the lower bound so that the rate did not become 
unreasonably high for the best performers55. 
2.2.4 Securitization of Income-Linked Loan Contracts 
One of the main differences between a traditional equity instrument and an income-linked 
loan contract is the investors right to exercise ownership. This is indeed what distinguishes 
ILL contracts from indentured servitude56. It is easy to see that investors holding only a few 
ILL contracts would be inclined to exercise pressure on the students he finances if he 
believes that them not perform as he expected. By pooling students together the individual 
student will gain a higher degree of anonymity.  
Markowitz (1952) showed that a portfolio of assets with a correlation of less than one, the 
risk adjusted return will be higher. From an investors point of view this is an attractive 
feature of an investment. 
                                                
54 Mick Jagger is the lead singer of the Rolling Stones. 
55 This applies mostly to Human Capital Contract, as Income Contingent Loans only would result in slightly speedier 
termination. 
56 An indentured servant is a laborer under contract to work for a specified amount of time for another person or a 
company/corporation. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indentured_servitude 
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These two arguments argue the case of pooling ILL contracts together in order to securitize 
them. This will allow investors to choose their exposure and the student anonymity. 
Regardless of who originate such a human capital security, government or private institution, 
it is evident that it would be a source of additional capital given that the return is attractive. 
Chile attempted to sell such securities to the private sector, but according to Palacios (2004, 
141) faced fierce opposition from students who clearly acted on a psychological reaction 
related to the fear and association to indentured servitude. 
Even though the idea of selling off student loans as securities resulted in negative public 
opinion in Chile the idea is intriguing. Imagine that these securities as for instance “engineer 
bonds”, “economist bond” or “medicine bonds”, these bonds would return a percentage of 
the average graduate’s income within its profession relative to experience level. If we 
disregard any tax effects this would essentially mean that a business could invest in its own 
human capital. A consulting firm for instance, could through a portfolio of Human Capital 
Contracts own the right to a percentage of their human capital. The firm could buy a contract 
for each position they offered. This way the firm would be able to hedge their salary 
expenses somewhat, but most importantly they would own and carry their employees 
education expenses. In those educational systems where the tuition is cover either partly or 
completely by the student this would make even more sense. It would give the firm an option 
of leasing or “buying” their employed human capital57. 
3. The case of Norway 
Currently approximately three out of four Norwegian students receive financial aid from the 
Norwegian State Education Loan Fund (NSELF, 2005)58. It is therefore safe to say that 
NSELF is the primary source of funding for students in Norway. Because most of the 
academic institutions are fully financed by the Norwegian government students only need to 
finance their living expenses during their studies59. 
                                                
57 Human capital in this instance refers only to education. Which is a very narrow definition. 
58 According to their annual rapport (http://www.lanekassen.no/upload/Arsrapport/2005/Årsmelding_2005.pdf) 
59 With the exception of a few schools. The Norwegian School of Management (BI) being one the largest. Students are 
offered additional loans to pay these tuition fees. 
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In this chapter I will go through the history of NSELF, the present loan and grant scheme 
and its features and trends among college applicants. I will discuss the present situation in 
Norway regarding the income distribution relative to education, as well as the income tax 
system. Finally I will discuss ways Norway could consider revising their repayment scheme. 
3.1 The history of the Norwegian State Education Loan Fund60 
The Norwegian State Education Loan Fund (NSELF) was established in 1947 with the 
intention of removing the inequity with regards to who would have access to higher 
education. The goal was to give everyone the same opportunity to obtain a higher education 
regardless of social background (Røseth, 2003). Until 1972 NSELF was discriminatory with 
regards to social background and the students family’s ability to fund the student61. Røseth 
(2003) has categorized NSELF’s financial aid schemes into five phases.  
Phase 
Supply of 
Educated 
Labor 
Governments 
ability to 
provide 
financial aid 
Sources of 
funding Subsidies 
Support Selection 
Criteria Organization 
(1930) Excess Weak Personal Low Tight62/Reward Private/Decentralized 
1. 1947 – 57 Increasing Increasing 
Personal/ 
Government 
(increasingly) 
Increasing 
Tight/Reward/ 
Regulation 
Private/Decentralized/ 
Government 
2. 1957 – 67 Shortage Growing 
Personal/ 
Government 
Strong Need/Redistribution Government/Centralized 
3. 1970‘ties 
Shortage/ 
Equilibrium 
Strong Government Strong Universal Government/Centralized 
4. 1980 – 95 Excess Reduced 
Personal/ 
Government 
Decreasing Tight/Incentive 
Increasingly private/ 
Decentralized 
5. 1995 - 03 Shortage Growing Government Increasing Universal/Incentive 
Government/ 
Centralized 
Røseth’s (2003) Classification of the different phases of NSELF. 
In the pre-war years there was according to Røseth little or no public support for a 
government supported financial aid fund. The universities and university colleges had their 
                                                
60 For a through discussion of NSELF’s history see Røseth (xxxx)  
61 According to Ingvild Våge at NSELF. 
62 Røseth uses the term tight in referance to a thigher policy than based on need. 
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own funds, which tried to aid student. Since there seem to be no demand for educated labor 
it made little sense to spend tax revenue on higher education.  
After World War II there was a consensus that there should exists a government fund to aid 
student from low-income families the same opportunity. This in combination with an 
increasing need for educated labor resulted in the establishment of NSELF in 1947. Initially 
it supported those with little or no opportunity of financial support from their family. As the 
need for educated labor, follow by the government’s increasing ability to finance the aid the 
support selection criteria widened. During the seventies all students were eligible for 
financial aid through NSELF. This resulted in an over production of candidates and an 
excess supply of educated labor, which, during the eighties resulted in reduced support for 
financial aid and NSELF. 
3.2 The present financial aid situation 
NSELF currently provides all students eligible63 financial aid for the ten-month academic 
year. While in school there accrues no interest on the loan. The students are allowed to 
borrow approximately 80 000 NOK annually or 8 000 NOK for each month of support. The 
financial aid is paid monthly into the student’s checking account64. When the student 
successfully completes his exams each semester 40 percent or less of the loan is converted 
into a grant65, subject to income and net wealth covenants of NSELF. Students are not allow 
to earn more than66 113 000 NOK in a calendar year or have a net wealth exceeding 223 600 
NOK while receiving financial aid67.  
After graduation there is a six months grace period until the student will start his payments 
on the loan, which is a mortgage type loan with fixed payments at a rate close to the market 
rate. The interest rate is discussed in more detail in the analysis below. The interest will also 
                                                
63 Any Norwegian citizen accepted into a approved school has the right to a total of eight years of financial aid. 
64 The rationale for this is to save the government interest. 
65 Effectively written off. 
66 In 2006 
67 Exceeding the covenants will result in a reduced grant, and will be checked against tax returns. 
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not accrued in case of unemployment, and it is possible to apply for a freeze off the interest 
rate and delayed payment, with certain rules limiting the use of such applications. 
The maximum repayment schedule, which according to NSELF most students use due to the 
favorable terms of the loan, is 20 years. 
The main purpose of the scheme is still to provide everyone with the opportunity of 
obtaining a higher education independent of social background.   
3.3 Income Distribution 
Being a heavily unionized social democratic welfare state the Norwegian difference in 
income relative to education level is less than for many other countries (OECD, 2005). 
Unfortunately there exists no distribution to show this directly, but as the Scandinavian 
countries are fairly similar in their social structure and salaries I will compare Sweden to the 
U.S.A. 
 
Source: OECD (2005) table A9.4c 
The blue lines constitute the distributions for Sweden while the purple lines are the 
distributions for the U.S.A. We Clearly see the difference in the distribution of income. In 
the Swedish case the income of the to groups center around the median, while for the US 
case it clearly shows the majority of each group at their respective far ends of scale. This 
should indicate that there is a greater economic benefit attached to obtaining a higher degree 
in the US compared to Sweden, and presumably Norway. The next diagram shows the 
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relative earnings between each education level for Norway, Sweden, The U.S.A. and the 
average of the OECD. 
 
Source: OECD (2005) table A9.1a68 
As we can see from the diagram Norway and Sweden is rather close. It is also apparent that 
there is an advantage of obtaining a higher education, but the payoff seems more significant 
for the US compared to the Scandinavian countries. 
3.4 The Norwegian Tax System
69
 
Norway has are two direct taxes; an income tax and a wealth tax. These taxes are generally 
paid as a percentage of income, and are paid both to the state and the local municipality. In 
addition there is a social security premium to finance public hospitals, medical treatment and 
various social benefits. Income taxes are progressive and follows this schedule70 
 
 
 
                                                
68 Note that the ISCED categories for these four levels are (0/1/2), (Upper secondary = 100), (3/4), (5+). Statistics Norway 
uses the following classification ’grunnskole’ (0/1/2), ’videregående’ (3/4), ’universitet og høyskole’ (5+)  
69 see http://www.skatteetaten.no 
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Taxable Income Tax Percentage 
< 29 600 NOK71 Social Security Premium 7,8 % 
< 31 800 – 61 100 NOK72 Income tax (state & local) 28 % 
< 394 000 NOK High Income Tax Level 1   9 % 
< 750 000 NOK High Income Tax Level 2 12 % 
Source: http://www.skatteetaten.no 
Depending on how Income-Linked Loan (ILL) contracts are treated with regards to taxation 
and the type of tax system would be an important factor. Imagine that the ILL contract 
applies to gross income, not just taxable income. The percentage paid on the ILL contract 
could be regarded as a valid expense due to the income being a result of the education 
obtained. Hence a tax deduction73 should be warranted. This would imply that at the same 
ILL rate two students, one being a low-income earner the other a high-income earner, would 
effectively pay different rates because of tax benefits. 
 
 5 % ILL Rate 10 % ILL Rate 
Minimum net ILL rate -0,96 % 2,64 % 
Maximum net ILL rate 3,60 % 7,20 % 
                                                                                                                                                 
70 This it just a simple representation of what an average employee would face. The tax system has a lot of exceptions and 
deduction rule that would be beyond the intention of this simple representation. 
71 A 7,8 percent is paid on the total income if above 29 600 NOK 
72 The minimum tax deduction is 34 percent of income with these lower and upper limits. 
73 In Norway 28 percent of interest paid is deductible from taxes paid. I have therefore deducted 28 percent of the ILL paid. 
Hence ignoring the distinction between interest and principal. 
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This diagram shows the effective ILL rate relative to income level at a 5 percent ILL rate if 
the ILL rate is tax deductible. It is interesting to note that in both cases of 5 and 1074 percent 
the minimum ILL rate is around 180 000 NOK.  
Another way of dealing with the tax issue is to apply a net interest rate on the principal. This 
is the solution used in Sweden. This also makes the rates more transparent, and does not 
penalize the high-income earner. 
An important question is what effect an ILL rate would have as it could be seen as an 
additional tax. I would argue that since the typical rate for a 20-year contract would be in the 
vicinity of 1,5 to 4 percent this would hardly deter anyone from earning or working, more. 
The progressive tax system already in place is like to be to dominant for those concerned and 
there dominate such a decision. 
Norway is a highly digitized country, and so are the tax services. After the turn of the 
millennium Norwegians have enjoyed this to the extent that their tax returns are filled in 
automatically and sent to them for verification by the local tax assessment office. In 2003 1,1 
million Norwegians delivered their tax return electronically, 191 000 of them via a text 
message on their mobile phone75. The point is at this level of digitization it should be easy to 
transfer the collection of loan payments to the Norwegian tax authorities  
3.5 Why should Norway change their system? 
The main question still remains unanswered. Is there a need to revise the current system? 
NSELF offers everyone the opportunity to get a higher education. The term on the loans 
offered seem reasonable and three out of four students make use of these loans to finance 
their education. While these facts are all true there is evidence that children of highly 
educated and high-income families seem to borrow more that students of low-income 
families with little education. Students pursuing the same degree seem to acquire equivalent 
amounts of debt, but there is evidence that student from high-income and highly educated 
                                                
74 Not shown in a diagram, as the shape is similar. 
75 http://www.skatteetaten.no/Templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=8458&epslanguage=NO 
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families pursue higher degrees that take longer to obtain. They also study abroad, borrowing 
towards their tuition, and seem more confident they will earn more because of their 
education (Fekjær, 2000). Fekjær (2000) argues that this is because children from higher 
social backgrounds seem to make most use of NSELF’s services; NSELF seems to benefit 
those from well of families first and foremost. This she claims might be due an attitude 
among children from families with parents with no higher education that “education is not 
worth borrowing for”. If we look at the income distribution relative to education discuss 
above, it is easy to see why children from a lower social background might have this attitude. 
The fact that obtaining a degree results in a substantial loss of income in the schooling period 
and in addition accumulates a sizable debt, makes little sense if the expected payoff is rather 
small. A change in student financing that corrected this view would benefit not only the 
potential student, but also society at large. Norway is a high cost country with regards to 
manual labor, except from highly educated labor (OECD, 2005). Given that this trend 
continues the most likely products produced in Norway in the future will be knowledge and 
technology. This will require more of high school graduate to pursue a higher degree, 
preferable in fields that generate knowledge and technology. 
A repayment scheme that is based on a percentage of income would be, if the rate is subject 
to the education is funded, be able to convey income information much better than the run of 
the mill news article. This would be a valuable tool when choosing education and career, as 
every student in Norway receives the same support. This would also help adjust what 
programs to expand and reduce and if the student chooses rationally this could potentially 
make the supply and demand in the labor market adjust accordingly. Of course this would be 
subject to availability of imported labor and other factors, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to discuss. 
Considering a repayment scheme that would follow a graduate’s income and make education 
economically beneficial regardless of income would certainly encourage more students to 
pursue a higher education. A financing scheme, which partly helps remove the cost of lost 
income in the schooling period, might also give more incentives to those from lower social 
backgrounds. One of the main feature of a ILL repayment schemes is that payments are 
lower in the beginning of the graduate career, this combined with the fact that most graduate 
have a need to take on larges mortgage in order to buy a house or car would suggest that 
these type of scheme would further encourage high school graduate to pursue higher 
education as the cost would seem low compared to the potential benefit. 
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4. Methods and data used to test theory 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the Norwegian State Education Loan Fund 
(NSELF) financial aid from 1972 until present with regards to alternative repayment 
schemes from the traditional mortgage type repayment plan it has adopted since its start in 
1947. The reason that I don’t analyze data previous to 1972 is that twofold; first – NSELF 
had discretionary financial aid before 1972; Second – pre seventies income statistics often 
had a different focus, and the income distributions and education level (and requirements) 
were very different from present day Norway. The main focus will be on income-linked 
loans. In this section I will explain: 
- The data used 
- Traditional financial mathematics involved 
- The model used to calculate the Correct Contract Rate (CCR) 
- A suggestion on how to make a loan contract that has Human Capital Contract 
features, but keeps the loan as an individual contract. 
4.1 Data used 
When searching for suitable data for this analysis I need income data by year of graduation. 
In addition to income data I need data on the financial support given to each class. It is 
obvious that this limits how diverse the selection of professions could be, as the availability 
income data is rather limited with regards to graduation year. The financial support data76 
and NSELF interest rate is available at on the NSELF website77. It also makes most sense to 
use nominal data as the inflation and the real interest rate both affect income growth.  
Because we are looking at a portfolio of loan contracts; the most interesting statistical value 
is the average annual income for each class, but in order analyze the factors of income-linked 
contract it is useful to have the as many cohorts as possible. In the data that I have used the 
upper and lower quartiles and the 90 percentile are also given. These four values for each 
individual class of graduates make the basis for my analysis and gives a fair picture of the ex 
post outcome. 
                                                
76 “kostnadsnorm” 
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Being a welfare state about 40 percent78 of the work force work for the government. 
Government employees are paid through a pay grade system. An employees pay grade is 
decided by many factors, of which education level is one such factor.  Hence, the length of 
your education is a deciding (though not the only) factor in which range of pay grades an 
employee will fall under. Your education level of course limits which positions you can 
hold, but in many instance this can be overcome by extensive relevant experience79. 
When collecting income statistics I tried many sources, but income by year of graduation 
seemed to be rather hard to find. Statistics Norway had the data, but as I have limited time 
and funds I could not buy the statistic from them. I therefore contacted many of the trade 
unions. To my surprise there was very few of the trade unions that had sufficient income 
statistics, especially for the professions that are employed by the government. The two 
sources80 that I have used which are described below had complete annual statistics dating 
back to at least the early seventies.  
4.1.1 Norwegian State Education Loan Fund (NSELF) 
An important variable in the analysis to investigate is the amount of financial aid that 
NSELF has been dispersing each year over the period analyzed. The financial aid is divided 
into a grant portion and a loan portion. In addition there has been some variations in the 
terms for the grant portion. Currently the financial aid is given as a loan. On successful 
completion of the education that the financial aid is meant to support the grant portion of the 
financial aid is written off by NSELF, hence given as a grant. 
 
It is important point out that in Norway there is no tuition for college and university 
education, though there is a symbolic fee81 per semester to the local Student Welfare 
Organization. Hence the financial support only covers living cost and course material. There 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 http://www.lanekassen.no 
78 According to http://www.ssb.no.  This number is irrespective of education. 
79 This statement is obviously not a valid statement for positions such as physicians, etc. 
80 I would like to thank Arnhild Sønsteby at Siviløkonomene and Øyvind Haldorsen at TEKNA for their help and for 
providing me with the data that make the foundation for this analysis. 
81 Currently approx. 400 NOK (15 USD) 
 44 
is no differentiation in the size of the financial aid between different school and educational 
program, but students attending private institutions will be granted additional loans to cover 
their tuition82. The grant portion of the financial support is a “living away from home” grant 
and is intended to cover the expense for housing during the 10 month the academic year. I 
have only focus on the loan portion of the financial aid, as this is the part of the financial 
support that is actually borrowed with the system current in place. One could argue that the 
relevant economic variable is the full financial aid, but that will not change the result of this 
analysis as it would only be a linear scaling; hence Twice the debt, twice the rate. This is 
easy to see why in the simple model presented below. 
4.1.1.1 The NSELF interest rate  
 
 
The other interesting economic variable is what interest rate would be relevant to use on the 
principal as well as a discount rate for the present value of cash flows such as income. All 
other economic variables, such as income data and the financial aid are given for the 
academic year, which is from September until September each year. I have used a geometric 
average of the NSELF rates for each academic year, as this is the relevant period for this 
analysis. In order to analyze the data with a uniform and perfectly inflation adjusted annual 
financial aid I used the consumer price index for Norway83. 
                                                
82 It is important to note that the most prestigious academic institutions in Norway are public institutions. The beginning 
salaries are on average higher for The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, compared to the 
private counterpart (http://paraplyen.nhh.no/cgi-bin/paraplyen/imaker?id=14884) 
83 CPI-JAE 
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There has been changing monetary regimes and a wide range of interest rate schemes offered 
by NSELF. I have consequently used the rate that reflects the floating or short-term options 
in the following analysis. In order to estimate a long-term interest I calculated the geometric 
mean of the NSELF interest rates that each class faced over a 10, 15, 20 and 25 year period 
and estimated the arithmetic mean of these estimations. This yielded an expected long-term 
interest rate of 8,5% that I have used as in the stylistic projections in this thesis. 
 
I also checked the development of financial support in Norway for the period in question. 
Checked against an inflation adjustment using the NSELF inflation rate and using the 
academic year 1975-1976 as the base year84 as this was the first year that offered uniform 
financial support for all students85. 
 
An observation worth remarking is that the percentage of the financial aid given, as a loan, 
seems to have increased more than the inflation in the eighties and was corrected early 
nineties. I discuss this earlier with regards to the history of the Norwegian State Education 
Loan Fund. That said the financial support seems to have followed inflation closely. 
                                                
84 The three first academic years are discounted by the appropriate inflation. 
85 The first three years (1972-1975) of the data I used had a differentiated support depending on place of study 
(geographically). I used the highest category which included Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim (the cities that had Universities 
at the time and educated Economists and Engineers) I would like to thank Wenche Merli and Ingrid Våge at NSELF for 
providing me with this information. 
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4.1.2 Income data 
In order to make a sensible analysis  the income data would need to be linked to the year of 
graduation. Of course there might be students that are delayed a year or two, as well as 
students that accelerate their education. In order to find sources of income data I tried 
Statistics Norway and checked the Official Norwegian Reports (NOU) made available in 
conjunction with the annual salary negotiations, as well as the professional trade unions. It 
turned out that the government agencies mainly work in terms of the average either for a 
profession or a position. The trade unions on the other hand divided into to different 
categories. Either they had excellent and complete statistics dating back to at least the 
seventies, or they only had statistics dating back about five years. The first category often 
had the greater portion of their members being privately employed, while the second 
category either had the major portion of their members either being publicly employed or 
self employed86.  
 
The data that I have used are given in annual rapports from Siviløkonomene (The Norwegian 
Association of Master of Science in Business) and TEKNA (The Norwegian Society of 
Chartered Technical and Scientific Professionals).  These two organizations have collected 
income data from its members and reported the mean, upper and lower quartiles, median and 
90 percentile for each year of income for each graduating class. The TEKNA data had a 
large response rate from both public and private employees, while the Siviløkonomene data 
had a rather small response rate from the public sector. The main observation is that there 
seems to be a fairly consistent that the long term average income growth is 8 percent for 
employees in the private sector and 6 percent for government employees. These findings will 
be discussed below. In the following section I will try to explain problems and observations 
from the data I found to be the most usable. 
 
 
 
                                                
86 A example would be Norges Juristforbund (The Norwegian Association of Lawyers). 
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4.1.2.1 Siviløkonomene (NSF) 
The NSF data did not distinguish between the public and private sector up until 1983, and 
even the post 1983 data often had incomplete data for the public sector87. But because I need 
the average income for each graduating class and the data pre 1984 pool private and public 
employees I calculated the weighted average of the public and private average for each class 
each year to have a uniform average throughout the sample period.  
For the quartiles and 90 percentile I used the private values as these represented about 90 
percent of the respondents88. Pre 1983 the 90 percentile is not given. These values are 
therefore omitted in any part of this analysis.  
Preliminary analysis for Siviløkonomene data 
In order to make some reasonable assumption in the projections in my analysis I have 
calculated the geometric averages for the first 5, 10 and 15 years after graduation for each 
class as well as for all data available for each class. 
 
As we see from the figure above the annual income growth seems to converge towards 8 
percent annually. We also see that the last four observations for the blue line have a rising 
trend. This could be due to either the fact that they consist of less than five observations or 
that there has been a boom the recently, giving employee larger bonuses or opportunities to 
ask for a raise.  
 
                                                
87 The statistics from years pre 2000 had rather low respondent rates from the public sector. In particular 1989 and 1990 are   
these are non existent.   
88 According to Arnhild Sønsteby at Siviløkonomene (NSF) about 10% of the members are publicly employed. 
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It does however indicate that there may be reason to assume a higher income growth in the 
first half of a graduate’s career in the first period of the data. In the table below you will find 
the arithmetic averages for each of the curves above. These averages seem to support the 
assumption that there is a stronger income growth in the first classes in the data. 
Average income growth for Business Majors (NSF) All 1974-1984 1985 - 2005 
Average income growth first 5 Years after Graduation  14 % 17 % 11 % 
Average income growth first 10 Years after Graduation 12 % 14 % 9 % 
Average income growth first 15 Years after Graduation 10 % 12 % 8 % 
Average income after Graduation On available data 8 %   
 
The diagram below represents the arithmetic average of all the classes each calendar year. It 
seems to indicate that there has been a trend of moderation in the income growth each year, 
especially from the mid eighties onwards.  
 
 
4.1.2.2 TEKNA 
The TEKNA data has a strong respondent base and has been collected and reported income 
statistics very consistently from 1946 until present89. I would also recommend this data as a 
source in the future due to its consistency. I used the data from 1974 until present. For this 
period there is no data for government employee in the1977 and 1986 data does not state the 
90 percentile. I solved this issue by averaging the data from the previous and following year. 
The value for graduates (first year of employment) was estimated by deflating the value of 
the following year value by the average of growth in the other values (classes of graduate) 
for those calendar years. 
                                                
89 A big thanks to Øyvind Haldorsen at TEKNA for providing me with this material.  
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Preliminary analysis for TEKNA data 
In order to make some reasonable assumptions in the projection analysis I have, in the same 
way as for NSF, calculated the geometric averages for the first 5, 10 and 15 years after 
graduation for each class (year of graduation) as well as for all the data available for each 
class. Since TEKNA has made the distinction between government and privately employed 
members I have analyzed both data sets individually. I will first look at the members 
employed in the private sector. 
 
 
As we see from the diagram above the annual income growth seems to converge towards an 
8 percent annual growth. This is consistent with the findings in the analysis for NSF. We 
also see that the last four observations for the blue line have a rising trend, but this trend is 
weaker than for NSF.  
 
It does however indicate that there may be as much reason to assume a higher income 
growth in the first half of a graduate’s career during the first decade of the data set. This is 
consistent with high inflation of this period. In the table below you will find the arithmetic 
averages for each of the curves above. These averages seem to support the assumption that 
there is a stronger income growth early in the career for the first decade, but slightly less 
than in the NSF case. It seems that pre the mid eighties this was more the case than in recent 
years, which seem to be quite consistent with 8 percent.  
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Average income growth for Technology Majors (TEKNA) All 
1974 – 
2005 
1985 - 
2005 
Average income growth first 5 Years after Graduation  12 % 16 % 9 % 
Average income growth first 10 Years after Graduation 11 % 13 % 8 % 
Average income growth first 15 Years after Graduation 9 % 10 % 7 % 
Average income after Graduation On available data 8 %   
    
 
 
Again we see that there is a trend of more moderation in income growth from the mid 
eighties. I will get back to this later in the analysis of the correct contract rates. 
4.1.2.3 TEKNA-G (public sector) 
Lets take a look at the analysis for government employees. These data are on average based 
on samples of on average more than forty observations per cohort, and therefore should give 
a general idea of the pubic sector. As wages for employees in the Norwegian government 
agencies are bases on pay grades (lønnstrinn), which again is derived from amongst many 
factors the length of your education90, it is reasonable to assume that these data are fairly 
equivalent to anyone with a master’s level degree. I checked the sample data that I got from 
the Norges Juristforbund91  (Norwegian Lawyers Society) for government-employed lawyers 
and it seems fairly consistent. 
 
                                                
90 As mention earliar your education often sets the premise for the level your pay grade can reach. 
91 Thanks to Karen Oppegaard Haavik at Norges Juristforbund for providing these income data. 
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Again we see that the income growth converges, but to 6 percent for government employee. 
This level is lower than for employees in the private sector. The trend also seems to be 
pointing down for the last few years, which is strange, as the direction of the trend should 
point in the same direction and be related to the business cycle. 
 
Average income growth for Technology Majors (TEKNA-G) All 
1974 – 
1984 
1985 - 
2005 
Average income growth first 5 Years after Graduation  10 % 13 % 7 % 
Average income growth first 10 Years after Graduation 8 % 11 % 6 % 
Average income growth first 15 Years after Graduation 7 % 8 % 6 % 
Average income after Graduation On available data 6 %   
 
Again we see that there is stronger income growth in the beginning of those starting their 
career in the first decade of the data, this is consistent with the high inflation in the beginning 
of their career. It is therefore reasonable to assume a 6 percent long-term income growth for 
government employees in the projection analysis.  
 
The following figure tells the same story as for the to previously shown, that there seems to 
be a trend of moderation in the income growth.  
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Again this shows the annual arithmetic average for each calendar year. If we compare the 
three curve it seems consistent that that they all moderate their demands from the mid 
eighties. The to TEKNA curve also have relatively similar shapes, while the NSF curve is 
slightly different. 
4.2 A Simple model 
As discuss earlier the Correct Contract Rate is the fraction the initial debt and the present 
value of income for that period. 
CCR =
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Here  denotes the income growth rate. The second model uses t to denote the initial year 
and T to denote the length of the contract. This is the model that I have used to calculate the 
Correct Contract Rates in the following analysis. It should be pointed out that in an ex ante 
situation, that is when the contract is signed, neither the borrower nor the lender knows these 
rates and need to make assumptions. These assumptions will have to be based on historic 
data, and I have made some estimate for the data that I have analyzed in the previous 
sections. These can be used together with an annuity formula to make a stylized projection 
for potential contract.  
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4.3 Variations of model used to test theory and data 
In order to study the data in light of an income-linked loan contract it is necessary analyze 
the different variations of such a contract. As discuss earlier there are four different 
variations of loan contracts. Serial loans matures with equal amounts each period of the 
contract until the principal has matured, annuities have equal nominal payments each period, 
a modified annuity where payments grow by a growth factor, income-linked loans are in 
essence a variation of a modified annuity as I showed in previous section. Income-Linked 
Loans (ILL) come in two main versions; Income Contingent Loans (ICL) which is a contract 
where the borrower commits to paying a percentage of their gross income until the principal 
is repaid. That is if you imagine the loan is an account, which either generate principal due to 
underpayment of interest, or reduction of principal because the payments exceed that of the 
interest incurred for that period. The other type of income-linked loan is a Human Capital 
Contract (HCC), which is a contract in which the borrower commits to paying a percentage 
of his gross income for a set period of time. 
4.3.1 Assumptions for the analysis 
I have made a few assumptions in the following analysis. All assumptions are made on the 
basis that I am only going to use the properties of the financial aid offered by NSELF. I am 
assuming that the grant portion and other terms of the financial aid offered are unchanged. 
Hence I will not go into a hypothesis of a totally different financial aid system, but use the 
policies currently in place. The main features of the current system, apart from the annuity 
contract are: 
- Interest free student loan while receiving financial aid  
- Link between completion of education program and grant 
I have also assumed that all students have successfully completed their programs. This is 
only a simplification. In addition I have also assumed that the TEKNA members received 4 
years of financial support. The engineering programs that most of these student attended are 
in fact four and a half years, but since this is mainly a level adjustment in the support 
received, and the NSF members have a four year degree I found it convenient to use a four 
years financing period so that it would be more comparable. 
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4.3.2 Projections based on assumption from the data 
Serial loans have the contrary properties of what we would want for a repayment plan on a 
student loan. It has a falling payment profile which would give the student higher payments 
when having a relatively low wage and the opposite later at the end of the contract. The 
reason to include it in this analysis is its linear properties. A serial loan has a linear principal 
and interest payment schedule. That is the nominal an effective interest rate is the same 
throughout the contract period, for a stylized static interest rate. 
Annuities are the Scandinavian92 standard student loan schedule. This is a contract type that 
in real terms also has a falling repayment schedule. That is the payments stay the same in 
nominal terms, adjusted for a changing interest rate. The Swedish National Board of Student 
Aid (CSN) has solved this by using a modified annuity93 repayment schedule in which the 
growth factor matches the Swedish Central Banks target inflation rate94 of 2 %. This is in 
essence saying that the graduates will repay with a flat real term repayment schedule, given 
that the central bank is able to adjust the interest rate so that the target inflation is met. In 
nominal terms this results in a payment profile that is rising. Hence the graduates pay 
increasingly higher payments, starting below the straight annuity level and finishing above 
it. 
For the Income-linked loan contracts I have used the historic averages from the preliminary 
analysis of the data. That would be a long-term interest rate of 8,5 % and an annual income 
growth of 8% for employees in the private sector and 6 % for the public sector. 
In the projection analysis I will look at the four different contracts stylistically with static 
interest and income growth expectations. This analysis will give an indication of the 
payment and amortization profiles as well as the movements of the principal and the interest 
payments. This analysis is intended to give the reader a good understanding of the four 
contracts as well as giving and indication of how the factors affect the contracts. 
                                                
92 Norway (http://www.lanekassen.no), Sweden (http://www.csn.se) and Denmark (http://www.su.dk) 
93 See http://www.csn.se/BlanketterOchInformationsmaterial/GenerellaFiler/PDF/6517B.pdf and 
http://www.csn.se/BlanketterOchInformationsmaterial/GenerellaFiler/PDF/6517B.pdf 
94  See http://www.riksbank.se 
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4.3.3 Estimating the Correct Contract Rate (CCR) and Actual Years 
Until Repaid (AYUR) 
This analysis estimates the Correct Contract Rates and the Actual Years Until Repaid95 for 
the cohorts of each class of graduates. The CCR is estimates as described above. 
The Actual Years Until Repaid is the number of year each cohort will need to repay their 
loan if they pay the CCR of the mean of their class. I estimated this through numerical 
analysis, running the loan at the estimated CCR for the mean. If using a Human capital 
contract this would be the same as the total loan being repaid by the class as a whole instead 
of individually, in essence an insurance portfolio between the students in each class. 
Alternatively it can be seen as how much off a contract rate calculated from the average 
student would be with regards to an Income Contingent Loan contract.  
4.3.4 Ratios between different contract lengths 
In order to get a better understanding of the dynamics of the ILL contracts I have estimated 
the ratios of the Income-linked loan contracts of different lengths for each graduation year. I 
used the upper and lower quartiles, mean and 90 percentile ten-year contracts as a base and 
compared them with the 15, 20, 25 year contract counterparts (matching cohorts). The ratios 
will give an estimation of how the different contract lengths affects the Correct Contract 
Rates, and therefore will give an indication of effects the contract lengths has on the price of 
the contract. 
4.3.5 Estimating the Year of Repayment for different Policy 
Contract Rates (PCR) 
Because of the problems in predicting the future, and the fact that student loans in Norway 
are almost completely provided by NSELF, the most likely terms of a contract would be that 
NSELF determined a Policy Contract Rate (PCR) and structured the contract either as a 
Income Contingent Loan (ICL - unlimited time length) or a Human Capital Contract (HCC – 
limited time length). The contract rate could also be structured as an Indexed Contract Rate, 
where the rate varies somewhat with the inter bank rate which is discuss below. I ran four 
different political rates of 10%, 7,5%, 5% and 2,5%.  
                                                
95 The number of year each cohort of each class of graduates uses to repay their debt at the CCR of the mean of its class. 
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4.3.6 Estimating the affect a Indexed Contract Rate (ICR) would 
have on a class of graduates  
The last technique is to let both the interest rate and the growth rate be variables. Lets take 
another look at the model. 
CCR =
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If we let the interest rate float for each period, that is we always use a marked rate, and let 
the  be the income growth be the last periods income growth, that is we adjust either 
annually or at some other sensible interval. This will in effect give each individual his CCR. 
Of course it can be argued that this will make a person pay less each time he or she gets a big 
raise, but that could be corrected by smoothing the growth factor by using geometric mean of 
the income growth from graduation until the current period. To solve for the first period it is 
reasonable use the current rate of an older class of graduate of the historic geometric income 
growth for a sensible period.  
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5. Analysis of results 
5.1 Projection analysis 
This analysis will give an idea of the characteristics of Income-Linked Loan contracts. The 
assumptions used in this analysis are the results of the preliminary analysis of the NSELF 
and NSF data in the previous chapter. I have chosen the estimates for a business student 
beginning his education the fall of 2006, hence due to graduate in 2011. I have used the 
estimates for employment in the private sector, as well as the private sector income growth 
of 8 percent. The reason for this is that a business graduate most likely to end up in this 
sector96. Annual financial support is currently approximately 50 000 NOK97. It does not 
however make much difference in these projections which beginning income or annual 
support is used. Being a stylized projection with the purpose of analyzing the characteristics 
of Income-Linked Loan (ILL) contracts the starting values are estimates anyhow, and that 
contract rate always will have to be rough estimates anyhow. As we know from the model 
the debt is linearly scalable; so doubling the debt only doubles the Correct Contract Rate 
(CCR). The opposite is true for the beginning income, given that income growth develops 
identically. 
If we first take a look at how the length of the financing period will have on at marginal 
contract length of 15 and 30 years. As we observe in the table below the average CCR 
marginal CCR are decrease as the financing period increases. This is a positive effect as it is 
more likely that a longer education is more likely to generate a higher income in the future. 
Hence we can conclude that ILL contracts give incentives to obtain the highest degree 
possible. It however important to point out that these conclusions are based on the 
assumption that additional years of support are a result of obtaining a higher degree and not 
delays in the students academic progression. We also see that students will enjoy the benefit 
of their ILL payments being lower than the annuity payment longer with a shorter repayment 
period. The number of actual years of this benefit would of course be lower as well, but it 
seems rather consistent that in a static example an ILL would result in smaller payment for 
the first half of the repayment period, given the CCR for that individual is used. 
                                                
96 As discuss before 90 percent of the members of NSF are employed in the private sector. 
97 The current loan is 48840 NOKfor the academic year 2005-2006, and it is likely to increase over the financing period. 
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Contract length 15 15 15 15 15 
Financing period 1 2 3 4 5 
            
Annual Income 340000 340000 340000 340000 340000 
Annual Income Growth 8,00 % 8,00 % 8,00 % 8,00 % 8,00 % 
Annual Financial support -50000 -50000 -50000 -50000 -50000 
Interest rate 8,50 % 8,50 % 8,50 % 8,50 % 8,50 % 
Repayment Growth Factor (modified annuity) 2 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 
CCR 1,02 % 1,88 % 2,62 % 3,23 % 3,74 % 
Average CCR (average rate cost per year) 1,02 % 0,94 % 0,87 % 0,81 % 0,75 % 
Marginal CCR  0,86 % 0,74 % 0,61 % 0,51 % 
ILL Beats Annuity until year 8 8 8 8 8 
ILL Beats Modified Annuity until year 5 6 7 7 8 
% Repayment time with ILL advantage      
Vs Annuity 53 % 53 % 53 % 53 % 53 % 
Vs Mod. Annuity 33 % 40 % 47 % 47 % 53 % 
 
Contract length 30 30 30 30 30 
Financing period 1 2 3 4 5 
            
Annual Income 
340000 340000 340000 340000 340000 
Annual Income Growth 
8,00 % 8,00 % 8,00 % 8,00 % 8,00 % 
Annual Financial support 
-50000 -50000 -50000 -50000 -50000 
Interest rate 
8,50 % 8,50 % 8,50 % 8,50 % 8,50 % 
Repayment Growth Factor (modified annuity) 
2 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 
CCR 
0,53 % 0,97 % 1,35 % 1,67 % 1,93 % 
CCR / Years of financed 
 0,45 % 0,38 % 0,32 % 0,26 % 
ILL Beats Annuity until year 
13 13 13 13 13 
ILL Beats Modified Annuity until year 
11 12 12 13 14 
% Repayment time with ILL advantage      
Vs Annuity 
43 % 43 % 43 % 43 % 43 % 
Vs Mod. Annuity 
37 % 40 % 40 % 43 % 47 % 
 
Financing periods here describes the number of year financed (years in school) the contract 
length is the number of years of repayment. The four last rows in each table show the 
number of years an ILL would have lower payments compare with an annuity contract. 
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Now if we look at the four different ways a loan contract can be structured (straight, series, 
modified, ILL), we see that the ILL structure (yellow line) has the lowest payments for the 
first half of the contract period, but is significantly higher at the last half of the contract. In 
essence the ILL contract is a modified annuity (purple) in which the growth rate is equal to 
the income growth98. The advantage as discuss earlier is that these contracts follow the 
graduate’s income. The diagrams below represent the same input as the previous tables with 
a 15-year repayment period (the upper table) and a master’s degree (5-year financing 
period). 
 
 
                                                
98 See chapter 4.2 for a more detail explanation 
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If we look at the movement of the principal for a 15 year and 30 year contract we see that 
there is significantly more risk involved in longer contracts, in the sense that the principal 
grows to approximately twice its initial size and repayments on the principal start after 18 
years. These contracts effectively do not only lend the student the financial support, but 
actually extends the loan by letting the lender increase the principal by not covering the 
interest that incurs on it. This is of course a function of the interest rate applied as well at the 
relevant income growth. 
 
Of course one could argue that this is not a transfer of fund only a financial alternative cost, 
but it increases the risk of recovering the loan regardless of altruistic motives. If an ILL 
contract were the alternative to a grant then of course the grantor would never actually 
recover the grant, and so you can claim that he at least most likely will recovers some of the 
“grant”. The point is that I do not believe that Income-Linked Loan contracts would be 
attractive to private investor for such a repayment period. As we have seen the Robertson 
Education Empowerment Foundation limits their contracts to 10 and 15 years, most likely to 
reduce this risk. 
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5.2 Analysis of Correct Contract Rates and Actual Years 
Until Repaid 
Lets move on to the estimation of the Correct Contract Rates (CCR) and the Actual Years 
Until the loan is Repaid (AYUR). I estimated the CCR and AYUR for all graduate class 
cohorts (1st quartile, mean, 4th quartile and 90th percentile) with old enough data series for 
contract periods of 10, 15, 20 and 25 years. The AYURs are the cohort’s repayment time 
using the mean CCR, as this would repay the loan for the class as a whole. The more 
fortunate pay more than the average and visa versa, but essentially the AYURs give an 
indication of how much of the estimation based on the average student in terms of a Income-
Linked Loan contract. 
Knowing the loan portion of the financial support did not follow inflation as closely as the 
total financial support I ran the estimation for a perfectly inflation adjusted loan. This way 
the results are comparable. I will only analyze the different data sources on 10-year contracts 
as this gives me the maximum number of reasonable observations.  
I would also like to note that I assume all of the members in these data sets to accept the 
contract. This is obviously a simplification, but as the purpose is to see how these contract 
act on real life data this does not really matter for the purpose of this analysis. 
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Average CCR for a 10 Year Contract (Average NSF Member) Inflation Adjusted 
Mean 1976-1995 5,2 % 
Mean 1985-1995 5,7 % 
 
 
Average CCR for a 10 Year Contract (Average TEKNA Member) Inflation Adjusted 
Mean 1976-1995 5,7 % 
Mean 1985-1995 6,3 % 
 
 
Average CCR for a 10 Year Contract (average TEKNA-G Member) Inflation Adjusted 
Mean 1976-1995 7,0 % 
Mean 1985-1995 7,7 % 
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The curves to the left describe the Correct Contract Rate for each class of graduate. We 
observe that for each year the CCR would have had to increase in order to be correct. The 
curves to the right describe how many years it would take the each cohort of each class to 
repay the loan fully at the mean CCR99.  
Looking at these results the most obvious observation is the regularity of the distance 
between the cohorts is not as stable as for those of the TEKNA data. This may be due to a 
greater variance in business graduates income or the number of respondents being higher for 
the TEKNA data.  
The TEKNA curves have almost perfectly similar distances between the cohorts over the 
period. The AYUR curves are also much tighter then for the Siviløkonomene data.  
Even though the CCR moves in an upward trend, which seem to peak in the late eighties and 
early nineties. As there is not enough data to analyze beyond the class of 1995 it is hard to 
say if the trend is stabilizing or sloping down again. This does however fit very nicely with 
our previous history lesson. As we remember Røseth’s fourth phase – the period of the 
eighties and the early nineties – was a period with excess supply of educated labor. This 
would most likely be the reason for the high rates.  
From this it is reasonable to conclude that estimating on the rate for the average graduate of 
a class will yield a result that would not punish any one within these cohorts to heavily. 
Meaning that with a cap for the top 10 percent it seem that the contract would be fairly 
reasonable to all. In the next section I will compare the different contract lengths. The fact 
that this is estimate on a 10-year contract would imply of course that these differences in rate 
would increase with the contract length. We will come back to this point in the discussion of 
the policy rates. 
                                                
99 The AUYR being zero indicates that there is not enough data to conclude. Letting the curve go to zero is only done to 
highlight this fact, and graphically show the distance between cohorts. 
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5.3 Analysis of Ratios between different contract lengths 
and a companied contract rates 
The table below contains the ratios between different contract rates of each cohort of each 
class for different contract lengths on each data set. Hence, a15-year CCR for the 90th 
percentile of the 1985 class is divided by a 10 years CCR of the 1985 class 90th percentile.  
NSF   Cohort Average 
Contract length Ratio 15/10 1Q 1,47 
Average Ratio 1,51 Mean 1,50 
   4Q 1,53 
    90 P 1,59 
Contract length Ratio 20/10 1Q 1,86 
Average Ratio 1,94 Mean 1,93 
   4Q 2,00 
    90 P 2,08 
Contract length Ratio 25/10 1Q 2,24 
Average Ratio 2,36 Mean 2,35 
   4Q 2,48 
  90 P  
    
TEKNA   Cohort Average 
Contract length Ratio 15/10 1Q 1,46 
Average Ratio 1,47 Mean 1,47 
   4Q 1,48 
    90 P 1,48 
Contract length Ratio 20/10 1Q 1,82 
Average Ratio 1,85 Mean 1,84 
   4Q 1,86 
    90 P 1,88 
Contract length Ratio 25/10 1Q 2,15 
Average Ratio 2,20 Mean 2,19 
   4Q 2,21 
   90 P 2,25 
    
TEKNA-G   Cohort Average 
Contract length Ratio 15/10 1Q 1,39 
Average Ratio 1,40 Mean 1,40 
   4Q 1,40 
    90 P 1,41 
Contract length Ratio 20/10 1Q 1,69 
Average Ratio 1,70 Mean 1,70 
   4Q 1,70 
    90 P 1,71 
Contract length Ratio 25/10 1Q 1,98 
Average Ratio 2,00 Mean 2,00 
   4Q 2,02 
   90 P 2,01 
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As mentioned earlier looking at the graph of the different contract lengths had a distinctly 
similar pattern, with the only difference being the available data and the level of the contract 
rate. This is also quite clear in this table were the differences between the cohort for each 
ratio is rather small. We can clearly see from the table above the ratios between the different 
contract lengths are fairly close to the average ratio between the contract rates. It seems 
reasonable that the ratio drops as the contract length increases as there is more interest 
incurred for longer contracts, but this negative effect seems rater small for most of these 
ratios.  The ratios are worse for longer TEKNA contracts and particularly the government 
data. This could imply that the stronger income growth results in a more linear ratio, the only 
differentiating factor in these ratios100. 
                                                
100 Starting income and initial debt are cancel out and the interest rate is the same for all three data sets. 
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5.4 Analysis of Policy Rate and Year of Repayment 
NSF 
 
 
TEKNA 
  
 
TEKNA-G 
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The purpose of this analysis is to see how long different an Income Contingent Loans would 
run for each cohort at different policy rates. I have, as with the CCR analysis, chosen to use a 
perfectly inflation adjusted loan instead of the actual loan data because the purpose of this 
analysis is to find the affect the rate has on the historic income and interest data and a 
inflation adjusted loan will provide a more comparable result. 
I have run the data for a 10 %, 7,5 %, 5 % and 2,5 % policy rates. The results, like expected, 
where fairly similar in shape and only the 10 % and 7,5 % gave a reasonable number of 
observations. I therefore will only present those here101. 
5.4.1 Sivøkonomene (NSF) 
The shape of the trend curve is very similar to that of the CCR in section 5.2, and we can 
also see that the spread of the cohorts is rater small for the period. The two quartiles seem to 
stay within a year’s distances of the mean, and the 90th percentile. Repayment time also 
seems to be more consistent over time for the 10 percent rate compared to the 7,5 percent 
rate. This is however expected since a higher rate also entails larger principal payments 
earlier and thus makes variations in the interest rate play a smaller role in the repayment 
time.  
5.4.2 TEKNA (private sector) 
The TEKNA data has the largest number of respondents of the data sets, and therefore could 
be assumed more reliable. This may be one of the reasons that the cohorts do not deviate 
more than 1 year for each class. We again see the pattern emerging and there is slightly more 
deviation for a 7,5 percent rate compared to a 10 % rate. It also seem that the ratios are fairly 
consistent as for the CCR discuss earlier.  
5.4.3 TEKNA-G (public sector) 
It is obvious that the policy rates seem to affect the repayment time more for the public 
employees. The trend is steeper and there are fewer of the classes that have been able to 
repay their debts.  
                                                
101 Can be made available for anyone interested. 
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5.5 Analysis of Indexed Contract Rates 
5.5.1 TEKNA 
1978 
 
1982 
 
1986 
 
1990 
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These curves show the 1978, 1982, 1986 and 1990 payments schedules of the TEKNA data 
set. The payment curve to the left shows the payments made by the four cohorts if the 
previous periods income growth is used as a base for growth in the simple model. Hence the 
payments are rebalanced every period with regards to the interest rate and the growth in 
income. For these curves all four cohort used an 8 percent income growth for the first year. 
The growth in beginning wages could have been used, but that could result in very an 
unattractive initial payment, or at least payment very close to the regular annuities. With 
better data a geometric mean of the historic growth rate could have been used. 
The curve named indexed is a modified annuity with 8 percent growth, which I showed 
earlier to be the expected income growth for this group. The middle curve subtracts the 
difference between the actual growth and the 8 percent expectation; meaning if you had an 
income growth of 10 percent one year your growth factor would be set to 6 percent, giving a 
higher amount to repay that year.  
The right curve uses a geometric mean of the income growth rates from graduation until the 
payment is made. We see clearly that this is almost perfectly correlated with the index, with 
a marginal exception of the class of 1982. The class of 1982 came into the job market during 
a period of high inflation, which resulted in abnormal high-income growth in the beginning 
of their career, as we see from the annual index curve on the right that has a significant dip 
under the index during the first few years. The geometric mean is used as a method to 
smooth the growth factor; this way the effect of loosing a high paying job does not give the 
effect of both decreased income and a higher loan payment. 
The curves on the right have the straight and modified annuities as reference. It is worth 
noting that the modified annuity, with a 2,5 percent growth, has a very small effect on the 
payment schedule. Its only effect is to give the borrower a flat repayment schedule in real 
terms, but not any significant financial relief. 
I will not analyze the Siviløkonmene data here, as they obviously would give similar results. 
However the geometric mean indexed schedule of that data set will be included on the 
comparison below. 
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5.5.2 TEKNA-G (Public Sector) 
1978 
 
1982 
 
1986 
 
1990 
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These curves present as with the previous analysis. The indexed curve is a modified annuity 
with 6 percent growth. The left curve shows how rebalancing each period with regards to the 
annual income growth and the current interest rate affected the repayment schedule. The 
middle curve shows how subtracting the difference between the actual income growth and 
the indexed 6 percent schedule. The right curve shows the cohorts using a geometric mean of 
the income growth from graduation until the payment is made. 
Again we see the geometric mean of each cohort is almost perfectly correlated for all classes 
of graduates. The two first classes have a rather significant deviation between the index and 
the geometric mean, but as we saw in the income analysis earlier the first period had higher 
volatility and therefore high growth then the average. The growth for the available data was 
at an average 6 percent for all classes and all data from 1985 and onwards. 
The most promising result here is that the geometric averages seem to correlate with the each 
other and hence the geometric mean of period between graduation and the payment is made 
could possibly be a reasonable growth factor to use for each class. This also seems to give 
the effect we are looking for.  
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5.6 Comparing the different methods 
5.6.1 NSF 
1978 
 
1982 
 
1986 
 
1990 
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The presentation on the left shows the income growth. Note that the notation is percentage of 
the previous year, so 100 percent growth is a zero growth. The middle curves shows NSELF 
interest rate and the inflation for each year. The last set of curves show the different payment 
schedules. These are presented in the “year of contract” as that is what we are comparing. 
The loans are perfectly inflation adjusted with the academic year 1975-1976 as the base 
year102. 
The immediate observation is that the income growth seems to be rather volatile. I should 
note that the expected rate for the four classes are different the classes of 1978 and 1982 I 
have used a 11 percent expected growth rate for the two first and 8 percent as we found for 
the last two. This is an adjustment is due to the fact that the income growth for business 
majors was higher in the first period as shown earlier and so this is closer to the likely 
expectation at the time these contract would have been signed. 
Another interesting observation is that the Human Capital Contract at the Correct Contract 
Rate seem to correlate rather closely with the geometric mean index adjusted schedule. It is 
not perfect match but close enough to conclude that this could be an interesting method to 
test on individual historic data103 in an econometric study. 
It is also worth noting that sudden changes in the interest rate kinks every payment schedule 
except the HCC, which smoothes the interest over the running period. 
                                                
102 The first year which had no differentiation in the support given. 
103 There exists data on good individual data on the Norwegian workforce from 1967 until present, but these require 
especial permit to use in research that I do not currently have obtained.  
 74 
5.6.2 TEKNA 
1978 
  
1982 
  
1986 
  
1990 
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The two most obvious observations are that for the two first classes, 1978 and 1982, the 
geometric mean rises sharply above trend at the beginning of the career and slowly descends 
back to the trend. The other two classes stay on trend with fairly moderate volatility. Which 
is positive since this results in the Income-Linked Loans being almost perfectly correlated104 
with the geometric index. The first effect where the graduate have steeper income growth in 
the beginning of their careers, declining over time seem to make the index follow the Human 
Capital Contract at a Correct Contract Rate; while the accumulated geometric mean will over 
value the growth and therefore give a larger discount on the payments that received with the 
Human Capital Contract or index. The effect seems to be the opposite for stable income 
growth, but the difference seems to be marginal. This would imply that the accumulated 
geometric mean method actually results in a fairly equivalent result, at least on the average. 
The movement of the rate of inflation has a fairly similar pattern to the income. Norway has 
currently a monetary policy where the central bank independently governs the interest rate 
by an inflation target rule of 2,5 percent. It is therefore reasonable to expect stable inflation 
in the known future. 
 
 
 
                                                
104 Note that the correct expected geometric mean for the class of 1978 is the last observation of the accumulated geometric 
mean, which is approximately, 11 percent; almost 5 percent higher than the expectation used for the other indexes.  
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5.6.3 TEKNA-G 
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1982 
 
1986 
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The result for the public sector is very much similar to that of the private sector. These 
schedules are based on a 6 percent expected income growth105. Income growth seems to 
follow income growth closely. Similarly sudden and large changes in the interest rates seem 
to create bends in the index and accumulated geometric mean schedules. The Human Capital 
Contract schedule seems to be less responsive to these changes, and is therefore more 
attractive for the class of 1990. That said the Correct Contract Rate used for the class of 1990 
is based on perfect information. 
 
                                                
105 For the class of 1972 I have use an expected rate of 9 percent. This is the historic rate for the period. We saw earlier the 
first period had high-income growth. For instance the geometric mean of the income growth for the class of 1973 in 1978 
was 13,6 percent in the public sector.  
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6. Conclusions  
In this thesis I have tried to show the effects an income-linked repayment scheme would 
have relative to a mortgage type loan in the case of Norway. The main focus has been on 
how student loans historically would have turned out for those with student loans provide by 
the Norwegian State Education Loan Fund (NSELF) from 1972 until present. 
The arguments presented in this thesis for the use of such a repayment scheme can be 
summed up as follows. The current financial aid scheme has a repayment scheme that leaves 
graduates with a higher repayment load relative to income early in their career when money 
is tight, only to become a marginal fraction of their income towards the end of the repayment 
period. For those who end up in high-income careers this is no problem. Those on the other 
hand who choose or ending up in less lucrative careers will with the current system in effect 
choose to disadvantage themselves relative to just start working straight out of high school. 
The type of repayment scheme discuss in this thesis would provide those graduates better 
liquidity in the start of their career, and thus alleviate some of this disadvantage. Essentially 
providing them a way to smoothen their consumption.    
The main reason for providing financial aid to students in Norway has been to give all 
citizens the same access to a higher education. Ever since NSELF was established in 1947 
the policy has been to provide children of less well-off families the same opportunities as 
those from a high-income family. There is evidence that there still is reluctance among 
children from low social backgrounds to obtain a higher degree and those children from 
well-off families actually seem to benefit the most from the current system. A system where 
the loan payments are more frequent and therefore have less impact would certainly provide 
a reasonable compensation to those choosing to pursue a higher education. 
I have through this text tried to give reasonable survey of income-linked repayment schemes, 
the current theory and historic experience. My analysis focuses on what the outcome of such 
a scheme would have on the students who in the past chosen to use NSELF’s service. That 
said this is not to say that they would have accepted this contract as such. 
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6.1 Evidence from the analysis 
In analyzing the dynamics of ILL contracts a few important properties needs to be mentioned 
here. (1) The marginal CCR rate decreases with the size of a loan, implying that it would 
favor a long degree programs as each additional year would be less expensive to add to the 
contract. (2) With a static interest rate and income growth over the repayment period a long 
period will substantially increase the implied principal, implying that a shorter contract 
length is preferable to for instance an average productive life approach106. (3) In a static 
scenario (as above in the previous point) the Income-Linked Loan contract would result in 
payments on the Income-Linked Loan contract to be less than annuity payments for 
approximately half of the contracts length. This would therefore give a substantial financial 
relief to low-income earners in the start of their career.  
The analysis of the historic data mainly showed the same relationship in two different forms 
in these data.  
First the Correct Contract Rate107 (CCR) for the different cohorts of a class of graduates 
would only differ about 1 percent from the mean to the quartiles, and only slightly more for 
the 90 percentile108.  
Second the Actual Years Until Repaid (AYUR) under the CCR for the mean of a class 
would also only deviate between one or two years. As expected the CCR for the public 
sector was higher than for those in the private sector. For the data in question a 10 year 
contract yielded a historically CCR for the private sector of about 5-6 percent while the 
corresponding rate for the public sector was about 7-8 percent. This could indicate that a 
differentiation between public and private employees might be warranted.  
The contract rates also seem to convey information related to the value of a certain degree. 
Depending on the information lag this could be an attractive feature with regards to 
                                                
106 I found for the expected long-term rates (approx. 8 percent) in my analysis that a 15 year contract would add virtually no 
principal, while a 30 year contract would add about 67 percent on the initial principal. This would result in the repayment of 
the principal about 20 years into the contract. 
107 The ILL rate at which an ILL contract would be repaid in exactly the repayment period specified.  
108 The business graduate had a slightly larger difference for those classes with the highest rates.  
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information to applicants of degree programs, as well as the labor market in terms of salary 
negotiations. 
I demonstrated that using the geometric mean of the income growth of a class of graduates 
career would be a pragmatic way to index the contract rate. This would yield a good 
approximation for a particular cohort. This would hence be fairly accurate way to estimate a 
dynamic indexed contract rate 
6.2 Past experience of Income-Linked schemes 
The first conclusion that we can draw from earlier experiments and implemented schemes is 
that success seem to be very much related to how these schemes have been structured. At 
first the idea of financing your higher education through a percentage of your future income 
seems like an intriguing solution. This solves the risks of those from low-income families, as 
they do not risk to accumulate a debt the may be unable to repay. At the same time investors 
reduce their risks, as there is also a potential reward to these contracts if the graduate does 
well in his career.  
The first case I presented was the Yale Tuition Postponement Option. This was a program 
where the student where grouped to gather and repaid in the form of an income contingent 
loan according to a percentage of their wage until their group had repaid there total debt. The 
maximum repayment period was set to 35 years, which was the estimated average length of 
productive life of the students upon graduation. The main lessons where that (1) the 
timeframe created a feeling of “perpetual obligation”, (2) a lack of understanding of the time 
value of money resulted in the graduate feeling that the repaid many times what they owed, 
(3) the redistributive effect of the scheme resulted in punishing those faithful to the program 
and therefore promoted default, (4) Yale as an academic institution lacked the proper 
expertise to collect such a loan. Those four lessons where ultimately the source of the 
experiments critic, and the reason the experiment is not considered a success.  
The second case presented was the Australian Higher-Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS). This was a result of an increasing demand for higher education, and a public view 
that higher education should not be fully state financed combined with a tight public budget. 
This scheme reintroduced tuition on higher education, but with a repayment scheme that 
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took the form of an Income Contingent Loan (ICL). The repayment schedule was 
progressive so that low-income earners paid less than high-income earners. This feature 
ensured that those with most success repaid faster then those with low-incomes, and 
provided a subsidy to those with less success, as there is no real interest on the principal of 
the loan. Repayment is made through the Australian Tax System. In addition a discount was 
offered to those that choose to pay their tuition without the use to a loan. The program was 
implemented in 1989 and is still in use today, and is considered a success.  
The third case presented was Sweden’s ICL scheme that was in place from 1989 until 2001. 
Being fairly similar to Norway is an interesting case to study with regards implementing the 
same type of system in Norway. The loan was to be repaid at a flat rate of 4 percent of the 
graduate’s income and the principal was to be set annually by the Swedish government. No 
tax benefits applied, as the interest on the principal was tax adjusted. The scheme was 
terminated in due to the fact that the scheme gave the students no incentives to finish their 
education on time. As with the Yale TPO their seemed to be a notion of “perpetual 
repayment”, and with no differentiation in repayment relative to the amount borrowed it is 
easy to see why many students took a “prolonged vacation”. Students seemed uncritical to 
the amount of debt they accumulated and the critics argued that many would be unable to 
repay the large debts.  
Other schemes worth mentioning because of their features are Chile, Ghana and The 
Robertson Education Empowerment Foundation. Chile’s ICL scheme, which has dual 
repayment period in which the repayment stops either after 12 or 15 years depending on the 
amount repaid by an individual. Chile also experimented with securitization to this was 
unsuccessful as student disliked “being sold”. Ghana chose different approach with regards 
to the collection and repayment scheme. Instead of collecting through either a designated 
agency the payments the payment were made through the social security premium. Most 
graduate accumulate the maximum retirement benefits before retirement age, and Ghana 
therefore let loan repayment take precedence over the accumulation of pension rights. 
Finally I want to mention the Robertson Education Empowerment Foundation scheme. This 
is a fairly new scheme but one of the features of this scheme is worth giving some attention. 
REEF has a condition that student must maintain a 3.0 GPA. This is a feature that has not 
been included in any of the previous scheme, and should be considered in conjunction with 
the Norwegian policy of including incentives into the financial aid scheme. 
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6.3 Which properties seem appropriate to use? 
It seems quite obvious that many of the above mentioned features should be included in a 
Norwegian adoption in accordance with the NSELF tradition.  
First it seems that the most effective way to collect income-linked loans is through income 
tax services. This seems to have been implemented into all of the successful systems. It also 
makes sense as since payments can be with every paycheck and reviewed through the annual 
tax returns and adjusted accordingly.  
Secondly it seems important that the loan payments are not perceived as “perpetual”. The 
two method described there are either by the Australian method of a progressive ICL 
schedule on the rates, or alternatively by limiting the payment period as with the Chilean 
system. As we saw in the projection analysis there is a financial argument for not using 
productive life as the repayment period. A reasonable adaptation of these to feature would be 
to estimate the rate that would approximately have the candidate repay the debt in 20 years, 
but let the loan run for as long as the graduate has income. This would give no incentives to 
wait with repayment, but at the same time crate the limited period feature. The progressive 
feature of the payments could be handle through the previously suggested tax deduction, 
which would result in an effective advantage to those with lower incomes at the same rate. 
Thirdly it seems reasonable to adopt a discount for students according their performance in 
school. These types of incentives are currently incorporated (lightly) in the current NSELF 
scheme by writing off debt when students pass their exams. With an ILL scheme this could 
be implemented through a discount for those who performed. Say a student passes an exam 
he gets a discount in accordance with his grade, as it is reasonable to believe that student 
who perform well in school also perform well in their career. This would also match the 
“screening hypothesis”109. It would also make sense because those who perform in school 
are more likely to get more highly paid jobs and therefore would need to pay a smaller 
fraction of their income as the Correct Contract Rate.  
                                                
109 The screening hypothesis claims that education is a way for student to show their abilities and differentiate themselves to 
future employers. See Barr (1989, 4) 
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With regards to the choice of Income-Linked Loan contract I would imagine that a transition 
from a mortgage type loan to a Human Capital Contract would seem too extreme a case for 
Norway. Also I would imagine that there would be a concern that this would make the 
contract unattractive to the best students. The benefit of the Income Contingent Loan 
contract is that it does not require anyone to provide Human Capital Option in order to give 
students protection against substantially overpaying on their contracts. An ICL contract 
would also provide graduate the opportunity to repay more than what is required if they 
wanted to reduced interest cost110. Graduate moving from Norway, and hence are not 
included in Norwegian tax systems, would be easier to handle in an ICL system as these 
could be converted to annuities while abroad.  
6.4 Final remarks 
One the purpose of this thesis was to explore an opportunity; an idea that in it self is 
intriguing to those exposed to it. I read The new financial order (Shiller, 2003) the first 
summer of my studies at the Norwegian School of Economics and this is how I stumbled 
across the idea of Income-Linked Loans. The idea of a student of loan financed as a function 
of their future income seemed intuitively reasonable. Shiller outlined some technical issues 
that would be a hindrance for such loans. Among these was the ability to check a graduate 
income and the fact that you would be likely have the problem of adverse selection due to 
student using different sources to finance their education. Both of these problems are in a 
way already resolved in Norway. Three out of four students use the Norwegian State 
Education Loan Fund (though this could change with a changing policy) and our tax system 
is highly digitized.  With these premises I think it is clear that a review not of the institution 
of student loan, but the way these are repaid is warranted. Norway has the ability to use a 
more sophisticated repayment system, and in conjunction with the trend of encouraging 
student to be innovative I would like to throw the ball back to the policymakers and advise 
them to be more innovative in the way student loan repayments are made.  
                                                
110 Although if NSELF continued to offer the marked rate with a small margin as they do to day this would not really yield 
much savings due to the time value of money. Essentially the student would only save the difference between the rate of 
return he could yield on other risk free investments (or his bank account) and the interest on the principal of his student 
loan. 
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6.5 Questions for future research 
- A more thorough estimation on an individual level of the studies I have conducted 
here could give more general insights. This should include tests of the Mincerian 
Human Capital Functions ability to predict the future income of candidates in the 
historic material available. 
- Checking the use of Black-Scholes pricing of Human Capital Options against historic 
income data in Norway. Would such a contract be attractive to private investors? 
- Investigate the income distribution with in different education levels. This would 
give a clearer picture of the advantage and expectation of income for different degree 
levels. And the variance at the different level. 
- Research incentives for “blue-collar” children to obtain a higher degree. Essentially 
investigating whom the “even bigger fool” is in the question of obtaining an (higher) 
education. This is essentially a more detailed investigation of income distributions. If 
income distributions where categorized by education (type of degree, level, trade) 
and done for both different higher degrees as well as high school diplomas leading to 
certificate of completed apprenticeship (for different trades and applications for such 
trades) this might render which education paths render the best opportunities for a 
high income irrespective of level. Essentially, which career would give the greater 
upside with regards to talent? 
- A study of how fresh students would respond to Income-Linked Loan would also 
make an interesting study. 
- A study of the effect of introducing tuition as was done in Australia and alternative 
way to create good incentive scheme for better (higher) education choice would be 
interesting. 
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Appendix A – Derivation of the Correct Contract Rate 
If we have for t  0 that Dt is remaining debt at time t and Dt+1 is remaining debt at time t+1, 
r is the interest rate, yt is the income at time t,  is the income growth rate and f is the Correct 
Contract Rate of the income-linked loan. The next periods remaining debt at the beginning 
of the next period (Dt+1) will be the interest incurred for period t minus the income-linked 
interest fraction of the income for period t. That is the income times the CCR (f). We would 
then have that 
(0)  Dt+1 = Dt 1+ r( )  y0  f 1+ ( )
t  
Let R = (1 + r) and Y = (1 + ). This would give us for t = 0 that 
(1)  
D1 = D0R  y0  f Y 0
= D0R  y0  f
 
This means that the remaining debt at the end of year one is the initial debt plus incurred 
interest minus the income-linked interest from the income of the first period. That would 
mean that if we wanted to payback the loan over a single period (highly unlikely because it 
would in essence be a traditional loan), would give us that the CCR is the initial fraction of 
the  
(2) 
0
0
00
0
y
RD
f
fyRD
=
=
 
Now let us continue the loan for another period. At the end of period two we would then by 
substituting D1 from the previous (1) get 
(2)  [ ]
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YfyRfyRD
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+=
=
=
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0
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Moving on to the third, fourth and fifth year we get:  
(3)  [ ][ ]
[ ]22
0
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0
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0
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++=
+=
=
 
(4) [ ][ ]
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If we now use the t for time notation on equation (4) and set t = 3 we get that 
(5) [ ]tttttttttt YRYRYRYRfyRDD +++= ++ 3122130101  
We now see a pattern emerging in the bracket that we can generalize to  
(6) 
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Since the point of any loan (hopefully) is to repay it, we know that Dt+1 = 0 for any t, where 
t+1 would be the length of the contract.  We would then find f as follows 
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Finally we should adjust the equation so that the T = t + 1 denotes the contract length since 
this would be more intuitive. Substituting t = T – 1 and generalizing through know 
mathematical analysis we get that 
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(8) 
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Now this is of course a stylized model. It is highly unlikely that we have a flat interest rate as 
well as a flat income growth rate over a long period of time, and these factors must therefore 
be investigated in the data used for the estimation of CCR. The CCR can be interpreted as 
being the percentage the initial debt makes out of the present net present value of future 
income in the contract period (not surprisingly). Notice also that if we set T = 1 (the shortest 
allowable contract length) we get that you will have to pay percentage the debt (with one 
year interest) of your first year income. Generalizing the model so that t is the initial time of 
the contract and T still denotes the number of periods for the contract. D0,t is the initial debt 
at time t. We get 
(9) ft ,T =
D0,t
yt+ i
1+ rt+ j( )
j=1
i+1
i= 0
T1

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